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INTRODUCTION

Immunity is everything that it's cracked up to be. As politicians and
warlords have always known, those entitled to it enjoy protection from liability
that similarly-situated defendants do not;' this is the case despite circumstances
that are practically identical, if not wholly S0.2 The plaintiff is just as injured in
one situation as the other, but his remedy may be denied him based on whether
or not the party he complains of enjoys the coveted status.3
To counter this state of affairs, immunity is seldom granted, and it is
often only qualified immunity at that.4 The lone body to which a blanket
immunity has always been granted in some form has been the sovereign itself.s
Whether under the historic justification that "the King can do no wrong," 6 or
for the practical reason that it is best to preserve the public treasury as much as
possible, the government-both federal and state-has deemed itself nearly
impregnable to actions taken against it.7 Of course, exceptions exist, but only
when the government deems that they do by way of a waiver.
When it comes to negligence, the sovereign-again, both at the state
and federal levels-has generally granted that waiver in America.9 Tired of the
trouble it took to grant case-by-case pleas for redress, most of these respective

I

See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident," and

Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 772-

73 (2008) (discussing the origins of sovereign immunity in American law).
2
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202
(2001) (stating that "[t]he effect of sovereign immunity is to place the government above the law
and to ensure that some individuals who have suffered egregious harms will be unable to receive
redress for their injuries").
See id.; see also JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, RUTrER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL

PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 2E, § 12 (national ed. 2015) (stating that "[tihe United States,

including its agency and employees, can be sued only to the extent that it has expressly waived its
sovereign immunity").
4
Unlike absolute immunity, an immunity that is qualified creates only a presumption of the
immunized state, which can be overcome. Other than tort claims acts, types of qualified
immunity include those involving families, charities, workers' compensation statutes, and state
and local governments. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVE F. PARTLETT,
PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 12,

§3

(13th ed. 2015).

5

See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201-03.

6

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 245 (12th ed. 1793)

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/blackstone bklch7.asp.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201-03.
See WAGSTAFFE, supra note 3, ch. 2E, § 12 (providing the list of waivers to sovereign
immunity).
9
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014).
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bodies have granted waivers by means of tort claims acts'-in which the state
deigns to be sued, generally, on any grounds that the courts recognize under the
common law." Where a tort claims act exists, no longer does the age-old
obstacle of the defendant's status stand in the way of a recovery.1 2 Plaintiffs are
free to proceed with their proof of duty, breach of duty, and damages. 3
Considering just the number of federal workers in America, potential liabilities
in the area are staggering:
[d]uring recent years it has not been uncommon to find that
there were some 3,000 lawsuits against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act pending before the federal courts
at one time involving claims of approximately $5 billion. New
suits are filed at the rate of more than 1,500 each year.
Administrative claims, presented by claimants each year to
federal agencies which is a prerequisite to filing suit, number
some 10 to 20 times this amount.14
If state claims figures were added, several more sets of commas and zeroes
could be added to the tally.
However, what the state grants, it can also take away. And when it
comes to matters that require discretion, the state will argue most stridently that
the waiver should not take effect. Under what is generally known as a
"discretionary function exception" ("DFE"),'5 courts must dismiss actions that
amount to no more than second-guessing the defendant's judgment on some
matter that the plaintiff claims led to his injury.1 6 In other words, if a plaintiff
asserts that he was injured because a government-owned park road was not
marked a certain way, or because a certain government-owned trail was not

The Federal Tort Claims Act is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014); a table
consisting of citations to state tort claims acts, as well as their discretionary function exception
sections, has been compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures. JAIME RALL,
10

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WEATHER OR NOT? STATE LIABILITY AND ROAD

WEATHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS (RWIS) 56-63 (April 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
transportation/Weather or Not-App_B_Rall_04.30.1 0.pdf.
I
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
12
See Nicole Melvani, The FourteenthException: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly Bars
Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REv. 395, 399-400
(2010).
13
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
14

1 LESTER S. JAYSON & HON. ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS

§1.01, at 1-8 (2014).
15
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
16
See generally JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 12.03.
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closed, both discretionary actions, then the defendant's judgment about whether
to mark the road or close the trail is not open to debate.'"
However, if the case in question involves non-compliance with a
mandatory matter (i.e., a rule that the government made and then broke), the
question of policy never enters the picture.18 Thus, the DFE does not come into
play, and the plaintiff may proceed to his proofs.
To put it another way, although a plaintiff cannot argue "you should
have done a better job of it," which amounts to second-guessin, the
government in matters of judgment and is disallowed under the DFE, 9 the
plaintiff can argue that "you didn't do what you said you would," which will
lead to government liability, if proven. 2 0 A government that did not follow its
own rule is open to that charge; as such, the waiver will apply. 21
But therein lies the question in such matters: does the case involve a
government-made rule? This precipitates yet another question: what exactly is a
"rule," in the sense meant in this context? Or, to put it another way, what is a
"mandate" and what is only a "guideline"? When is something an
order/directive/charge, a failure in the observance of which will be addressed
under most iterations of tort claims acts, and when is it merely a
suggestion/counsel/resolution, which will require a further inquiry-whether
the matter is policy-related, and therefore the subject of discretion for which the
government does not waive its immunity? 2 2 With so much turning upon how a

statement is communicated, what are the criteria by which courts can make an
objective analysis, one based upon scientific factors that will bring a muchneeded level of clarity to this cloudy area?
There are two prongs to the test of the DFE: (1) whether the
government statement is a mandate or a guideline; and (2) whether that
statement is policy related. Much has been written about the second question.23

17
See, e.g., Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 975-76 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
decision not to post warning signs in the national park was protected by DFE).
18
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the discretionary function exception is "to

prevent 'judicial second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
19
See id.
20
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (stating that "the discretionary
function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow").
21
See id.
22
See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814.
23
As stated by the Supreme Court in the seminal case, Berkovitz, there are two questions that
government
must meet in order to invoke the discretionary function exception successfully:
the
(1) "whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee;" and (2) "whether that
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield."
Representative articles analyzing the discretionary function exception's policy prong include:
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But little has been written about the first question, related to whether alleged
breaches should be considered mandates or only guidelines. Since the second
question is only reached by going through the first,24 the matter is no small
thing. But all in all, the courts have bumbled around with the issue. 25 They have
been no more direct in articulating their analyses of it than the parties to such
lawsuits have been in arguing that a particular government statement was either
an absolute directive or only a passing recommendation.26 The analysis must
begin and end with more than charges that "they had to do it!" and "we did
not!"
This Article intends to bring some order to the discussion, both by
means of explaining what the science of the language arts-linguistics-says
about the matter, and by explaining how that science comports with what courts
think they are doing when they determine a government statement is, or is not,
a mandate. Linguists have considered language crimes before, 27 relating to
perjury, bribery, and criminal threats, 2 8 and I myself have conducted a
linguistic analysis with regard to the civil law Tarasoffcontext (i.e., "duties to
warn" 29), but a linguistic analysis of mandates as opposed to guidelines has not
yet been attempted.
Part II will explain the background involving the Federal Tort Claims
Act and its state law counterparts, particularly with regard to the development
of the DFE. Part III will demonstrate what mandates mean by the employment
of speech act theory and the concept of implicature, both of which are
dimensions of pragmatics, 30 itself the branch of linguistics dedicated to
explaining how language functions in context.3 1 Part IV will demonstrate the
type of analysis that the courts have used in determining whether a government
statement is a mandate or a guideline. Part V will set out an analytical
framework-a set of factors-for courts to use in determining this issue, based
Andrew Hyer, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal
for a Workable Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1091; Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief': The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of DiscretionaryImmunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1275
(2002); Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis: United
States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection ofFederal Sovereign Immunity, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
447 (1997); Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the FederalTort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REv. 365 (1995).
24
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
25
See cases cited infra note 326.
26
See cases cited infra note 326.
27
See ROGER W. SHUY, LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN
at xvi-xvii (1996).
See id. at 20, 97, 136.
29
See A.G. Harmon, Backfrom Wonderland: A Linguistic Approach to Duties Arisingfrom
Threats ofPhysical Violence, 37 CAP. U. L. REv. 27, 34 (2008).

THE COURTROOM,
28

30

See id at 36-37.

31

See id. at 34.
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both upon the pragmatic study conducted in Part III, and upon a formalization
of what precedent shows the courts have been doing, which is the subject of
Part IV. This part will also prioritize the factors, suggest a rationale for their
application, and explain how they square with other tools of statutory
interpretation and construction. Part VI will conclude.
II. THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, TORT CLAIMS ACTS, AND THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

The concept of sovereign immunity is historically grounded in the
doctrine of the divine right of kings.32 This theological and political concept is
of ancient lineage, by most accounts traced from Justinian 33 down through
centuries of development and elaboration in ecclesiastical law.34 English
jurisprudence kept the idea alive through various iterations,35 and the concept
developed in America by way of a trio of caseS 36 that were based on what one
judge considered purely practical grounds 3 -- preserving the ability of
government to function:
Every government has an inherent right to protect itself against
suits, and if, in the liberality of legislation, they are
permitted, it is only on such terms and conditions as are
prescribed by statute. The principle is fundamental, applies to
every sovereign power, and but for the protection which it
affords, the government would be. unable to perform the
various duties for which it was created. It would be impossible
for it to collect revenue for its support, without infinite

See generally Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349 (1925);
Stanwood R. Duval, Sovereign Immunity, Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield?, 84
32

TUL. L. REv. 1471 (2010); George W. Pugh, HistoricalApproach to the Doctrine of Sovereign

Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins ofAccountability: Everything
IKnow About the Sovereign's Immunity, I Learnedfrom King Henry III, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393

(2005).
33

Seidman, supra note 32, at 415-16.

34

Id. at 409.

35

Id. at 402-30.
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269 (1868); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. 122
(1868); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152 (1868). According to the leading treatise on the FTCA, the idea of
sovereign immunity, though not expressly stated in the Constitution, is derived by implication.
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.01 (citing Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin.
Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934); Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933)).
3
Duval, supra note 32, at 1477-78; see JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.01
(stating other justifications for the doctrine).
36
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embarrassments and delays, if it was subject to civil processes
the same as a private person.38

-

Thus, although political 3policy replaced ecclesiastical imprimatur, the
consequence was the same. 9 There are many demands upon the contents of the
governmental purse,40 and a reluctance to make disbursals is a natural reaction,
even when fraud-an ever-present concern when the public fisc is involved 4 1
is not the case.
Of course, such a practical stance has its drawbacks-namely, the fact
that the government, through its agents, can and does hurt people. 42 To deal
with this reality, the first way around the doctrine was by means of private
legislation, sponsored by a legislator. This means was subject to all of the
delays, objections, and frustrations commensurate with a legislative body
From the
conducting what in effect amounts to judicial determinations.
45
federal perspective, complaints about the process began at least in the
administration of John Quincy Adams, carried through to the administration of
Millard Fillmore,4 6 and ultimately led to the establishment of the Court of
Claims Act in 1885.47
The problem with the aforesaid act was that although it relieved
Congress of investigating claims against the government, the court itself could
not act upon those deliberations.48 Judgments still had to be rendered by
Congress. 4 9 This only had the effect of postponing the delay of justice to a later

38

Nichols, 74 U.S. at 126.

See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201-03.
See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 1.01, at 1-8.
41
See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers,Parasitesand Patriots,81 U. CIN. L. REv. 1261, 1261-62 (2013).
42
See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 533, 547 (1988) (stating plaintiffs
allegations-that the federal agency acted wrongly by approving the release of a polio vaccine
that caused a two-month-old infant to contract polio disease-and holding that the complaint
survived the government's motion to dismiss based on the DFE); Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903,
910 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Navy was negligent in its failure to post a warning sign and
that such failure caused an accident, in which several people died).
43
See Walter Gellhorn & Louis Lauer, CongressionalSettlement of Tort Claims Against the
United States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1955).
4
See generally PrivateBills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1684 (1966).
4S
Not a great deal has been written about the history of state tort claims act. But see Lauren
K. Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: The States' Obligations to Their Citizens Under Federal
Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543, 547-53 (2003).
46
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.02, at 2-6 to 2-7.
39
4o

47

Id.

Id. § 2.03, at 2-9 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144 (1872)).
49
Id. (stating that "[the court's] decisions . .. were subject to the approval or disapproval of
Congress").
48
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date, and the amount of time Congress spent on reviewing the record amassed
by the court was no less burdensome than its prior investigatory role.so Most
important for the tort claimant, the Court of Claims Act did not confer
jurisdiction to hear tort claims.5 1 A legislative attempt to remedy that problem,
by including tort claims jurisdiction in the Tucker Act of 1887, was
unsuccessful.52 Enacting various carve outs permitting tort claims in limited
areas was the pattern over the successive years, but no comprehensive reform
was proposed until after the events of 1945.54
That year, in a tragedy grimly reminiscent of 9/11 in many waysother than the fact that it occurred by accident, not terrorist design-a U.S.
Army bomber lost its way in a dense fog and crashed into the Empire State
Building." Many people were killed and property damage was extensive.56 The
fact that because the plane was federally owned, the suits against the
government were consequently barred, did not sit well with either the claimants
or the public. 57 Twelve months later, the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed in
August of 1946, permitting suit in tort against the federal government:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing
on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private

50
51
52

Id. at 2-10.
Id. at 2-11.
Id. § 2.04, at 2-17.

Id.
Id. at 2-18.
5s
Id. § 2. 01, at 2-3.
56
See Gregory C. Sisk, The ContinuingDrift ofFederalSovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,
50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517, 535 (2008) (stating that "ten people on the ground, in addition to
the flight crew of the American military aircraft, lost their lives, others were injured, and
substantial property damage resulted").
5
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.01, at 2-3 (stating that "[tihe victims of this
frightful accident must have been shocked . . . that there was no judicial remedy available to them
through which they could recover damages from the United States Government"). Before the
FTCA, the only remedy available to the victims of government employees' tortious acts was to
petition the Congress for the passage of a private bill. Century-long deliberations in Congress and
many victims with no redress led to the enactment of the FTCA. Id. at 2-4.
58
Id. at 2-3.
5

s4
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person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
But just as the government granted jurisdiction to sue as a general principle, it
also reserved that immunity in certain cases by way of exception-a tactic that
is a constant theme in this area.6o Among that list is the DFE 61: "[amny claim . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 62
As stated above, the application of this exception required the courts to
develop a two-prong test: (1) "whether the action is a matter of choice for the
acting employee," and (2) "whether the judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield." 6 3
The first prong, "whether the action is a matter of choice" (i.e., whether
it is a mandate or not) is the subject of this Article's inquiry.
III. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF MANDATES

Before turning to an analysis of what courts have done and are doing in
their assessments of statements in the DFE context, this part will explain what
the field of language studies can contribute to such an analysis. Indeed, a
linguistic breakdown of the matters involved can help determine how a
particular statement is functioning in the language, providing scientific
explanations for that inquiry that other approaches cannot.64 The most useful
field of linguistics for this inquir is that of pragmatics,6 5 but the field of syntax
can also play an important role.

&

59
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014). For the legislative history of the FTCA, see JAYSON
LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §§ 2.09-2.13.
60
See generally JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §§ 2.01-2.10 (discussing sovereign

immunity of the government and the gradual development of the waiver to it, which was subject
to many limitations and specific circumstances at various stages of its development).
61
For the full list of statutory exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Implied exclusions are
discussed in JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14,
62

63

§

11.03.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).

6
See SHuY, supra note 27, at 1-2 (discussing the importance of language analysis in
criminal cases and stating that "the field of law must rely on what is known about how language
works in order to evaluate legal evidence which just happens to be in the form of language").
65
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 34 (discussing the usefulness of pragmatics as study of
language in context as applied to the duty to warn).
66
See, e.g., Craig Hoffman, When Worldviews Collide: Linguistic Theory Meets Legal
Semantics in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1215, 1219 (1995)
(discussing the connection between the legal statutory interpretation and syntax, and stating that
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A. Pragmatics
Pragmatics is devoted to the study of language in a situational context,
as opposed to the study of its structure. As such, it explains the way language
is used (i.e., in conversation, spoken or written), not how it is made (i.e., its
component parts, the arrangement of those parts, etc.), which is the purview of
grammar. 9 When the question is whether a certain statement qualifies as a
mandate or a guideline, as it is in tort claims cases concerning the DFE,70
pragmatics can supply the necessary analytical tools for both the advocates and
the decision-maker.7 In other words, if the litigants in a tort claims contest are
arguing about whether a certain statement was mandatory or merely precatory,
pragmatics can supply legitimate evidence to be used by both parties in arguing
their positions, as well as a scientific means for a court to use when faced with
making that assessment. At this juncture, two important areas of pragmatics
must be explained: speech acts and implicature.
1.

Speech Acts

In his work How To Do Things with Words,72 philosopher John Austin
demonstrated that while some statements seek to describe a reality-and can be
judged as "true" or "false"-other statements not only say something, but also
do something.73 For example, if one party makes a promise to another party, he
not only says the words "I promise X," but by using those words in the present
tense, in fact makes that promise.7 4 Indeed, it is impossible to make a promise
without uttering the requisite words in the prescribed way. Synonyms may be
employed-"pledge" or "vow," etc.--or even signs substituted for spoken

"the syntax and the legal principles work together to form an integrated interpretation of the
statute").
67
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 34.
68
See id. at 34 (stating that "pragmatics can help establish whether the triggering event [of
duty to warn] occurred or not" when analyzing what has been said and heard in the "situational
context").
69
See Craig Hoffinan, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary When InterpretingLegal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &PUB. POL'Y 401, 403 (2003).
70
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (stating the first prong of the test
to determine whether DFE applies).
n
See generally Harmon, supra note 29 (discussing the usefulness of pragmatics in
determining whether the duty to warn was triggered).
72
J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 14 (2d ed. 1975).
Id. at 98-99.
74
Id. at 7.
7
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 40-41 (explaining that by uttering the apology in the
present, the accountant not only said it, but also did it-i.e., "apologized").
73
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speech (the gesture of a cross made over the heart, for instance). But the
expression of the promise must be made to communicate that promise;16 if it is,

nothing more need be done, for the promise is made by the very act of its
utterance." It is a fully integrated, existential, metaphysical occurrence.
This is only one type of speech act, and a particularly special kind at
7
that; n there are many others, as will be explained below, but at this point it is
important to appreciate the gravity of Austin's contribution. For our lives
revolve around what we do with words. As linguist Anna Wierzbicka points
out, in a way that particularly resonates with the tort claims DFE context,
from morning to night, we seek to interpret what other people
are saying, i.e, what kinds of speech acts they are performing.
Virtually every time someone opens his or her mouth in our
presence, we seek to categorize their utterance as this or that
kind of speech act. Was this a threat? Or just a warning? Was
this a suggestion or rather a request? Was this a criticism or
just a casual remark? Was this a hint? ... The difference
between a threat and a warning may be a matter of life or
death; the difference between demand and suggest may be a
matter of bad relations or good relations with another person.
("I wasn't demanding anything, I was just suggesting. . . .").
Further, when it comes to the law, what is done with words is the whole point.so
In fact, the question of the mandatory/precatory nature of the speech acts in the

76

See id.

77
See id. at 40 n.59 ("Austin termed such acts 'performatives,' i.e., locutions that 'perform'
the act that they name.").
71
Id. at 40.
7

ANNA WIERZBICKA, ENGLISH SPEECH ACT VERBS: A SEMANTIC DICTIONARY 3-4 (1987).

Dr. Wiersbicka adds, "[i]t would not be an exaggeration to say that public life can be conceived
as a gigantic network of speech act. History itself seems to consist largely in acts of speech acts
(threats, condemnations, offers, demands, negotiations, agreements, and so on)." Id. at 3. The
aptness of this phrase to the legal context is apparent, as the law deals essentially with offers,
promises, demands, threats, warnings, bribes, etc.
10
See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, The F-Word: A JurisprudentialTaxonomy of American
Morals (In a Nutshell), 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 65, 74 (1999) (citing B.E.S. v. State, 629 So.2d
761, 764-65 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (where the court examined the nature of the words uttered
by the defendant and stated that depending on the status of the addressee and ordinary human
perception, the words could or could not provoke a violent response by the addressee)); C. 0.
Wolfe, Property-Limitation of Estates-Rule in Shelley's Case-Remainders-Statute of
Limitations as Affecting Same, 1 TEX. L. REv. 316, 316 (1923) (giving an example of the deed of
conveyance and stating that "[t]he primary principle adopted by the courts in the construction of
written instruments is to gather, as nearly as possible, from language used in the instrument itself
the intent of the maker").
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tort claims context is the difference between immunity and potential liability."
Everything hinges upon the determination.8 2
i.

Types of Speech Acts

To return to the explanation of speech act theory, some definitions and
distinctions are crucial. First, any statement, whether made by an individual
or a group, involves two things: the locutionary act (i.e., what is said) and the
illocutionary act (i.e., what is done; in the above example, the promise).84
Second, a particular illocutionary act can fall into one of several categories,
depending upon what kind of illocutionaryforce is intended by the speaker
(i.e., the objective sought), be it a question, a confession, a demand, etc.
Although there are many classifications of illocutionary acts,8 6 Austin's pupil,
philosopher John Searle, set up a classification that will be followed in this
analysis. I have used the following examples for the types of illocutionary
acts in another article and quote them here for ease of reference8 8 :
1. Representatives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves to the truth of the proposition made. E.g., "The
sky is blue." (Under this category would fit illocutionary
acts such as asserting, confessing, admitting, forecasting,
etc.)

89

2. Directives: A statement by which speakers intend to get
their hearers to do something. E.g., "Go to the grocery store
for me." (Under this category would fit illocutionary acts
such as insisting, demanding, requesting, advising, etc.) 90

See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) ("[C]onduct cannot be
discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice" and that the "[DFE] will not
apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the
directive.").
82
See id.
83
See AUSTIN, supra note 72, at 98.
84
Id. at 98-99.
81

85

Id.

86

Id.

8
John R. Searle, A ClassificationofIllocutionaryActs, 5 LANGUAGE SOC'Y 1 (1976). Searle
is of the opinion that the basic unit of human linguistic communication is the illocutionary act. Id.
88
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 41.
89
Id.; see also Searle, supra note 87, at 1.
90
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41. Searle includes questions-requests for information-as
directives. Searle, supra note 87, at 11.
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3. Commissives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves, to certain expressed acts. E.g., "I'll help you
with your homework." (Under this category would fit
illocutionary acts such as promising, vowing, pledging,
etc.) 9
4. Expressives: A statement by which speakers convey their
internal psychological states or feelings. E.g., "You have
my sympathy for your loss." (Under this category would fit
illocutionary acts such as apologizing, congratulating,
condoling, objecting, etc.) 92
5. Declarations: A statement by which speakers change the
status of some entity. E.g., "You're under arrest." (Under
this category would fit illocutionary acts such as
christening, surrendering, excluding, bestowing, etc.). 93
Apropos to the tort claims DFE analysis, a "mandate" 94 would be
classified as a "directive," as the speaker is ordering another to do something. 95
Interestingly, a mere suggestion is also a type of directive, but does not have
the power that the mandate does.96 That is, it seeks to influence behavior (i.e.,
to gain what is sought), but it does not command/order that it be done.97 A
suggestion offers an array of things and highlights them as particularly apt or
illustrative, but it falls short of saying that those things must come to be.98 In
other words, the suggestion paints out a picture, points to it and says "this is the

Consider the following:
Searle notes G.E.M. Anscombe's point that each illocutionary act seeks
either to match the "world to the words" (I am going to make my statement
come true in the world) or the "words to the world" (I am going to make my
words resemble some truth in the world). A mandate, as a directive, seeks to
bring the proposed act objectively true in the world by way of ordering the
behavior, and therefore its "direction of fit" is "world to the words."
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41 n.65; see generally G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957).
92
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41; Searle, supra note 87, at 12.
93
Harmon, supra note 29, at 42; Searle, supra note 87, at 13.
94
The word "mandate" is being used for simplicity's sake, and is meant to be synonymous
with "order," "command," "direct," etc. Similarly, "guideline" will be used as a general term that
stands in for "suggestion," "advisement," "counsel," "principle," etc.
91

Searle, supra note 87, at 11.
See id. ("They may be very modest 'attempts' as when I invite you to do it or suggest that
you do it .... ).
9
See infra Part III.A. 1.v (describing the classifications of verbs by groups).
98
See infra Part III.A.1.v and text accompanying note 137 (defining "suggest" as a verb in
the "advise" group).
95

96
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kind of thing that ought to be done";9 9 a mandate, on the other hand, chisels out
a sculpture, points to it and says "this is the very thing that must be done."' 00
It is important to understand that a suggestion may vary in emphasis;'0o
it may even be strongly or emphatically stated, but it always falls short of a
mandate.1 02 Note that a "demand" is also a directive, but even though it is more
strongly stated (and the context is usually one in which the speaker is asking for
the fulfillment of something to which he claims entitlement), the degree of
emphasis and even the pique with which the statement is made do not turn it
into a mandate.1 0 3 For the latter, there must be some power over the hearer.
That is a condition of that category and one of several that a particular
statement must meet to qualify as such.' 0 5
ii. IllocutionaryForce

For a locutionary act to have the intended illocutionary force, Austin
determined that certain conditions must be met. 06 Depending upon the
particular class, these conditions decide whether a statement is "felicitous" (i.e.,
has the requisite illocutionary force), or is "infelicitous." 0 7 I have explained the
kinds of felicity conditions in an earlier article and quote that explanation here,
with its list of pertinent examples' 0 8 :
1. Preparatory Conditions: condition(s) that precede the
utterance.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense), the
penitent must have done something wrong under the code
of his faith.
See infra text accompanying notes 134-39.
See Searle, supra note 87, at 11.
101
Compare Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The ostensibly
mandatory language 'is required' . . . did nothing more than explain the needs that arise in an
emergency."), with Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the language of a manual to the effect that "initial attack response may vary depending on
availability of resources" was discretionary).
102
See infra text accompanying note 139 (stating the difference between "order" and "ask").
1o3
While a demand in the strictest sense may imply that exact kind of power, it is often used
in a sense that makes it synonymous with "insist." See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying
text.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 123-29 (describing the "order" group).
105
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 42-43 (describing the conditions that must be met in order
for the utterance to have the desired effect on the hearer).
106
AUSTIN, supra note 72, at 98-99.
107
Id. at 54-71.
10
Harmon, supra note 29, at 42-43 (internal citations omitted).
99

100
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Sincerity Conditions: conditions that relate to the speaker's
state of mind.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense), the
penitent must be truly sorry for the wrong he has done.

3.

Essential Conditions: conditions that require the utterance
be recognizable as the type of illocutionary act in question.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense), the
penitent must express his contrition in a confessional booth
or some other dedicated space, to a priest or minister, using
language or formulary phrases that imply regret-"I
.

confess that . .

4. Propositional Content Conditions: conditions that relate to
the proper context of the statement.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense), the
penitent's utterance must predicate the penitent's past
act-"I'm sorry that I lied to my wife."
Again, each speech act has its own set of these conditions, which must
be met for them to have the intended illocutionary force.109
iii. PerlocutionaryEffect
One other feature of speech acts must be explained before proceeding
to set out the felicity conditions for a mandate. Distinct from both the
locutionary act (the utterance) and the illocutionary act (the force of that
utterance) is what Austin termed the perlocutionary effect (i.e., the effect that
the utterance has on the hearer)-such as the elicitation of concern, pity,
surprise, delight, etc."o The perlocutionary effect is what the speech act

The following is also illuminative: "The primary function of speech act verbs consist in
interpreting people's speech acts, not in performing speech acts." WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at
16.
110
AusTIN, supra note 72, at 101-08.
109
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creates;... if the illocutionary force is the pistol's report," 2 the perlocutionary
effect is the runners starting from their blocks." 3
In the DFE context, the directive mandate should have the
perlocutionary effect of compliance with the content of the locution. That is, if
the mandate is "pave the road with asphalt and mark it every two miles with
road markers," the subordinate will have to do what the mandate requires (or
suffer the consequences of non-compliance, whatever they may be-reprimand,
demotion, fine, discharge, etc.). Evidence that there was no repercussion for
non-compliance (i.e., that there was no enforcement) might refute the sincerity
condition.'1 4 In other words, a claim that "nobody ever did X because they
(those in a position of authority over the matter) never enforced X, and so
nobody ever took X seriously," if supported by evidence of such non-feasance,
would go some way towards showing that the statement was not a true directive
at all. The speaker would be estopped from saying a mandate existed if he
never treated it as such himself.
Indeed, the failure to enforce a mandate might affect the
recognizability of future similar mandates. That is, an unenforced "directive"
might become such a scarecrow that similar "directives" would not be taken
seriously, regardless of how they were "put"; the perlocutionary effect of nonenforcement could compromise the essential condition with regard to even a
more boldly stated directive: it would not be recognizable anymore because the
force behind it would not be feared or res ected, leading to a consequent noncompliance with its propositional content. " A lack of enforcement might also
affect the preparatory condition of future similar "directives," in that the
speaker would have lost his authority to be heard; " 6 if the king does not wield
his sword, he loses the power to speak his word.

"

See id.
See id. at 98-99 (defining the illocutionary force as the intention of the speaker to provoke
certain kind of behavior).
113
See id. at 101 (defining the perlocutionary effect as the effect the speaker's words have on
the addressee).
114
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 43 (defining "sincerity condition" as "relat[ing] to the
speaker's state of mind").
115
"The Boy Who Cried Wolf," one of Aesop's Fables, is an example of the perlocutionary
112

effect described here. See BEN EDWIN PERRY, BABRIUS AND PHAEDRUS 462 (1965). Fear of

"course of dealing" has instigated the "No Implied Waiver" or "No Oral Modifications" clauses
in contracts, forbidding the interpretation of leniency in one instance as being precedent for
future leniency. See CHARLES M. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL
DOESN'T TEACH You 248 (2002). However, such attempts to restrict the parties' freedom to

contract can be found impermissible. See, e.g., Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp. v. Annapolis Towne
Ctr. at Parole, LLC, 25 A.3d 967, 983 (Md. 2011) (holding such a clause unenforceable).
116
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 42-43 (defining "preparatory conditions" as "condition[s]
that precede the utterance" and explaining by means of an example that before a sin is confessed,
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iv. Felicity Conditions:Mandates
With this general appreciation of felicity conditions and perlocutionary
effects, it is now possible to construct a scheme of felicity conditions for a
mandate that would trigger liability under a typical tort claims act:
1.

Preparatory Conditions:
The mandate must be spoken by the proper party (i.e., a
mandate cannot be given by one who does not have the
authority to speak);
The mandate must be directed toward the properparty (a
mandate cannot be followed unless the hearer is both in a
position to do what is mandated and is obligated in some
way to perform what is done).

2. Sincerity Conditions:
This condition relates to the earnestness of the speaker, and
can be refuted by evidence that shows the perlocutionary
effect of the statement was not that of a directive (as
explained above).' 17 If the supposed mandate was never
enforced, and if the hearers did not take the speaker
seriously, the effect of the speech act belies the sincerity of
the locution." 8

3.

Essential Conditions:
The mandate must use language that denotes an
imperative, whether communicated directly or indirectly;
The mandate must be specific (orders require action, and
unless they can be carried out explicitly, they do not
qualify as orders);
The mandate must take the proper form (the more formal
the communication, the more recognizable it is as a
mandate--e.g., a statement made in an official employee

a sin must be done). Therefore, a commitment of sin is a preparatory condition to utterance of
confession.
117
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.iii and note 114.
118
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.iii and note 114.
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handbook regarding "duties" as oposed to an offhand
remark made during a lunch break).'
4. Propositional Content Condition:
The content of the mandate must predicate that a future
course of action be taken.1 20 Of all the conditions, this is
the least debatable in the terms of the DFE context, since
both mandates and guidelines are future-oriented, and the
immediacy of the mandate or guideline (i.e., whether it
mandates/suggests something be done as soon as possible
or over a span of time) does not alter its character.
If any of these conditions is not met, the attempted communication of a
mandate is "infelicitous;"1

v.

as such, it is not a directive at all.

Semantics

With regard to the essential conditions, particularly with regard to the
imperatives used, a diversion into the field of semantics is important. Semantics
is the field of language studies concerned with meaning.1 22 As such, a
taxonomy of imperatives/orders, which can be used in the construction of a
mandate, as well as a taxonomy of requests/advisements, which cannot, will be
useful in the analysis to follow.
In her dictionary of speech act verbs, Dr. Wierzbicka breaks
imperatives into a group of "Order" words and explains the underlying set of
assumptions in each. I have selected the following, along with Dr. Wierzbicka's
illuminating commentary, to create a taxonomy. The entrants listed here go
some ways towards satisfying a component of the essential condition for a
mandate. Some of these words will be more commonly used than others in the
tort claims context (some will in fact rarely be used), as government statements
that purportedly require compliance are most often written, rather than
communicated orally. However, with this caveat understood and appropriately
appreciated, the following list suggests the semantic parameters of mandates:

Arguably, the form that the statement takes is also a preparatory condition.
Similarly, the propositional content condition, one of the felicity conditions, "relate[s] to
the proper context of the statement." Harmon, supra note 29, at 43. Some event must take place
before a certain statement is made, which affirms the occurrence of the event. See id
121
Id. at 42 (stating that "[ifj a requisite condition is absent[,] the utterance is said to be
'invalid' or 'infelicitous"').
122
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories
of Statutory Interpretation-andthe IrreducibleRoles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 685, 688 n.11 (2014).
119
120
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"Order"Group1 2 3
Order:
A person who orders someone to do something wants the
addressee to do it and expects to cause him to do it via the
speech act. He presumes that the addressee has to do whatever
the speaker says he wants him to do, and that the addressee
understands this. He doesn't appeal to the addressee's feelings
or goodwill, but he does appeal to his understanding.
Utterances which are meant to trigger immediate and quasiautomatic reactions tend to be reported as commands, rather
than orders . . .. If a response is expected to be delayed, order

is more appropriate [thus, order is future-oriented, whereas
command is present-oriented]. 124
Command:
Unlike orders, [commands] don't appeal to the addressee's
understanding. The most typical commands have the form of
set phrases ("Fire!", "Sit!), which act upon the addressee as a
Pavlovian signal acts on a dog. Naturally, the speaker expects
an immediate response.
Commands are typically present oriented, because they
expect to trigger a semi-automatic response....

...[Another difference is that] in the case of order, the action
doesn't have to be performed by the addressee himself. For this
reason, one can say, for example, "The Prime Minister ordered
a survey/an investigation/a search," and so on, but not "The
Prime Minister commanded a survey/an investigation/a
search." In this respect, command behaves like tell and
instruct, whereas order behaves like request and demand.12 5

123
With regard to orders, Dr. Wierzbicka explains the unspoken assumptions made by the
speaker in this way: "Whether we say 'I order you to do it!' or simply 'Do it!' (with the
intonation and demeanor characteristic of an order), we are expressing the following attitude: I
want you to do it[;] I assume that you have to do what I say I want you to do." WIERZBICKA,
supra note 79, at 16.
124
Id. at 38.
125
Id. at 39.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

1026

[Vol. 118

Direct:
Directing is similar to telling (to) in being, intuitively
speaking,
somewhere
between
requesting
and
ordering/commanding: the directing person wants the
addressee to do something, and expects to cause him to do it by
his speech act; at the same time, direct does not envisage any
possible conflict of wills (as order does) and it expects
conscious cooperation rather than automaton-like obedience, as
command does. The directing person expects that if the
addressee knows what the speaker wants him to do, he will be
willing to do it. Thus, the speaker expects compliance but not
blind obedience. (In this respect, direct is similar to instruct, as
well as to tell.) 12 6
Instruct:
The person who instructs [in the imperative sense] someone to
do something wants the addressee to do it and expects to cause
him to do it by the speech act. One can't instruct one's equals
or superiors to do something.. .. But the nature (or the
interpretation) of the relationship is not as hierarchical in the
case of instruct as it is in the case of direct: a "director"
assumes that his subordinates have to do things that he directs
them to do (if these things are within the scope of their formal
relationship);1 27 but when somebody instructs his agent, lawyer
or personal assistant to do something, the expectation is that
they want to do whatever they are instructed to do-not
because their personal wishes coincide with the speaker's
wishes, but because their subordination to the speaker is
voluntary and constitutes an aspect of a freely accepted
professional or quasi-professional relationship.1 2 8
Require:
In some ways, require can be said to be halfway between order
and request. The main difference between require and request
concerns the element of obligation. Request implies that the
addressee doesn't have to do whatever is requested. For

Id. at 43.
Id. at 45. Note how this statement relates to the preparatory condition. See supra Part
III.A. .iv. The formal relationship between the parties presupposes that the speaker has authority
to speak and that the hearer has the authority to follow the direction.
128
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 45.
126
127
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example, printed invitation forms which say that somebody
"requests the pleasure" of somebody else's company don't
imply that the addressee has to attend. By contrast, if a Court
requires that somebody should attend a court session, the
implication is that the addressee has to do it. Presumably for
this reason, invitations couldn't be phrased in terms of require,
and court summonses couldn't be phrased in terms of
request ....
Require is less personal than order in another way, too. What
the speaker wants is not so much another person's action as a
certain state of affairs.1 2 9
Of course, other verbs may be added to this list, and depending upon
the context, some of those listed might not amount to a mandate, even though
their basic semantic make-up would suggest that they do. Further, as will be
seen, more important than any of these verbs to the construction of a mandate
may be the use of a certain arrangement, or collocation of words, or the use of a
particular modal, which can take any verb-even one that does not belong to
the taxonomy just set forth-and give it the force of a directive.
Similarly useful in the task of distinguishing mandates from guidelines
is a taxonomy of words that Dr. Wierzbicka included in groups she nominated
30
"Ask" and "Advise."o
As stated with regard to the "Order" words, these two
groups are not meant to be exhaustive, and some would be unlikely candidates
for inclusion in a governmental utterance. However, they are listed below to
convey the kinds of semantic concepts that underpin guidelines. A selection is
set out below, along with Dr. Wierzbicka's commentary.
"Ask" Group
Ask:
The asking person wants the addressee to do something that
would be to his (the speaker's) benefit. He assumes that the
addressee can do it, but he doesn't assume the addressee will
do it."'

Request:
According to [C.J.] Smith [citations omitted], request "is a
more polite word for the same thing as ask." "Nevertheless,"
he goes on to say, "it is sometimes used with an implied sense

129

Id. at 47.

130

See id. at 181-90.

13

Id. at 50.
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of authority, amounting virtually to a command." Studying the
differences in the usage of ask and request one comes to agree
with Smith's judgment: request is more elaborately polite, and
yet more forceful than ask. Ask is direct, personal and informal;
request is formal, impersonal, markedly polite and yet selfassured ....

Request doesn't imply any superiority or inferiority either,
but it does imply a specific sort of relationship: formal, distant,
and impersonal.132

Urge:
Urging is an attempt to get the addressee to do something. To
that extent, it is similar to ask, request, order, command and
many other verbs. Unlike ask and request, however, it doesn't
imply that the speaker is seeking a benefit for himself, and
unlike order and command, it doesn't imply that the speaker
has power over the addressee.
. . . [T]he

only

kind

of pressure

he

can

exercise

is

psychological.' 3
"Advise" Group
Advise:
Advise has two different meanings, and two different sets of
syntactic frames ....
Advise, can be performed by means of a bare imperative
("Hand it this way, he advised"), and, like ask, invite, suggest
and many other speech act verbs, refers to a possible future
action of the addressee. The speaker thinks that he knows what
the addressee should do-and he says so, confident that it will
be a good thing if the addressee follows the proposed course of
action ....

Like suggestions, advice does not have to be solicited. 13 4

132
13

Id. at 50-52.
Id. at 61-62.
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Advise 2 is an official speech act, often performed (in writing)
by institutions addressing individuals. It is also characteristic
of lawyers, agents, and other professional people, who need to
convey information to their clients and other members of the
public, implying that they are acting in the addressee's
interest.... [I]n the case of advise,, the speaker specifies what
the addressee should do. In the case of advise2 the addressee's
action is not specified; what is specified is the information
which is expected to be followed by some sort of action on the
part of the addressee.135
Recommend:
[I]n recommending, as in advising, the speaker thinks that he
can guide the addressee's future actions in some way, and that
the addressee would welcome this. This means that in both
cases the speaker expresses his view concerning the
addressee's future actions in response to the addressee's actual
or imagined invitation for him to do so....

...
[A]dvising aims at saying what the addressee should do,
whereas recommending seems to aim at saying what would be
good for the addressee. 3 6

Suggest:
The person making a suggestion thinks that it might be a good
thing if the addressee did something. He invites, therefore, the
addressee to imagine himself actually doing it, so that he can
form an opinion about this possibility, and decide whether or
not he wants to follow it.137
Propose:
The person who proposes something ... envisages a collective
action, including both the speaker and the addressee. The
speaker himself is in favour of this collective action, but he
knows that he cannot cause it to take place unless the other

136

Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 185-86.

137

Id. at 186-87.

134
135

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

1030

[Vol. 118

people involved also express themselves in its favour. What he
wants to achieve, therefore, is to make those other people
consider this action and to say whether they want it to
happen. 3 8
Dr. Wierzbicka makes a fundamental distinction between "ask" and
"order" in the following comment:
[T]he common part of order ("I order you to do it") and ask ("I
ask you to do it") can be represented in terms of the sentence "I
want you to do it," and the additional semantic components of
order can be portrayed as "I assume that you will do it" and "I
assume that you have to do what I say I want you to do,"
whereas the additional semantic components of ask can be
portrayed as "I don't know if you will do it" and "I assume that
you don't have to do what I say I want you to do."'39
Finally, another group has significance for mandate formation:
"Declare"Group
Declare:
When the chairman of a meeting declares the meeting open he
does it not only "to cause people to know what they should
think," but also to cause them to act accordingly ....

Declare...
world ....

seems to create a new situation in the external
140

Pronounce:
Pronouncing involves saying something about a given entity,
doing it in an authoritative way, as if determining the correct
way for this entity to be viewed, and implying serious
consequences for this entity.141

138

Id. at 188.

139

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.

140
141
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Resolve:
Resolve .. . refers to a speech act which is not self-contained
but which culminates a certain process. Most other speech act
verbs can be analysed as bundles of simultaneous
assumptions ...
integrated into a single act. But resolve
implies a past, as well as a present ....
[With the background of a group wanting to do something
about a matter, discussing it, and coming to know what they
want to do], the speakers proceed to say what they want to do,
assuming that saying it will lead them to doing it. Their
purpose consists not in informing other people about the
conclusion they have reached, but simply in articulating it for
themselves and in committing themselves to a common
goal ... .1 142
Note that a governmental body may make a general statementaspirational in nature-that amounts to its taking up of a duty-a "resolution,"
as it were.143 But a resolution is a commissive, not a directive;144 it is afromise
to do something in general, but it does not say how it is to be done.14 That is
often how courts articulate a statement's failure to meet the DFE, by holding
that the rule maker required that something be done, but did not elaborate on
how it should be done.1 4 6
In contrast, mandates must be clear and actionable. 147 A resolution is a
philosophical position without a plan. 14 8 Regardless of the plan, it must be
actuated-given arms and legs-by way of one or more mandates. 149 Likewise,
decrees, proclamations, and pronouncements, however authoritatively spoken,
fall short of a mandate when they stay at the level of generalities.so As shall be
seen, a great deal turns upon how much is said and in what way. 5 1
Id. at 359. "Decree" is in this group as well, and is an institutional order or command. It
could be used in a mandate, but is so imperious that it is unlikely to be. See id at 353-54. Other
words such as "proclaim" have the same cast to them. See id. at 352-53.
143
See infra Part IVA.
144
See Searle, supra note 87, at 11-12.
145
See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.i and note 91.
146
See infra Part IV.C.3.
147
See supra Part III.A.1 .v and note 123.
142

148

See WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 358-59.

See, e.g., Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a regulation
provided that a designated officer would enforce it, but did not prescribe a specific course of
action of how that would be achieved, and thus, the regulation lacked the mandatory nature and
the actions of the designated government officer fell within DFE).
Iso
See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
149

1s1

See infra Part IV.C.
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Once more, the above taxonomies cannot be, and are not intended as,
an exhaustive vocabulary for either end of the spectrum-neither for mandates
nor for guidelines. However, since one of the felicity conditions (essential) of a
mandate is that it be recognizable as such, 15 2 and the words used to form it
contribute in the most prominent way to the manifestation of that
recognition,' 53 these taxonomies can provide some criteria for the
determinations that courts must make.
2. Implicature
Another major area in the field of pragmatics is the study of what
philosopher Paul Grice refers to as the "cooperation principle."1 54 That is, for a
conversation to take place, the participants must cooperate with each other by
providing certain information to each other-in the amount, type, and manner
expected, as well as with the proper motivation. 155 Grice termed the "maxims"
as follows:
Maxim of Quality: The
information. 5

conversant responds with true

Maxim of Quantity: The conversant responds with the amount
of information-no more and no less-that is called for.5 7
Maxim of Relation: The conversant responds with relevant
information.

58

Maxim of Manner: The conversant responds in a way that is
expected. 159
But when a conversant intentionally replies in a way that breaks one of these
maxims, he is said to have "flouted" that maxim;' 60 this gives rise to an implied

152

See supra Part III.A. 1.iv and note 115.

153
See supra Parts III.A.1.ii, III.A.1.iv (stating what kind of language must be used to satisfy
the essential condition).
154

H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45-

46 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
15s

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id.

15

Id. at 46.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 49.
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meaning, or "implicature."l61 Again, I have used an example of implicature in
an earlier article that suffices here:
[A] client might ask his accountant whether he needs to report
certain cash income on his income tax return for the year, to
which the accountant could reply: "Do you want to get
audited?" Obviously, a layperson would suggest, the
accountant is really saying: "The law requires you to report
that income." But at the level of language, a great deal takes
place in order for that meaning to be conveyed in the indirect
way that it is. 162 First, the implicatire "The law requires you to
report that income" is not part of the accountant's utterance; by
definition, the implication is always unspoken. Second, the
implicature is not "entailed." That is, the implicature does not
follow as a matter of course from the utterance. If the
accountant had responded to the client's question: "You have
to report that income on page two of your return," then the
broader answer, "The law requires you to report that income,"
would be entailed within the answer given. In the above
exchange, by responding to the client's question with another
question-"Do you want to get audited?"-the accountant is
said to "raise the implicature" that the income must be
reported.

...

By flouting the maxim of relation, the accountant in the

example above "raises the implicature" that taxes are owed.
The client unconsciously reasons as follows: To my question
about reportingcash income, Accountant did not answeryes or
no, but asked me a question about something other than
reportingincome-i.e. whether I wanted to get audited, which
of course I don't. I asked him about one thing and he told me
about something else. He intentionally did this, so I infer that if
I don't report the income, I risk an audit.163
All this makes the point that illocutionary acts can be made in indirect
ways and are no less explicit for that fact. Searle noted that indirect speech acts
are made when the syntactic form of the locution fits one classification, but

161

Id. at 44.

Sarcasm, parody, and satire are all representative of the type of speech events that use
indirectness to achieve their desire effects.
163
Harmon, supra note 29, at 36-37.
162
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carries the illocutionary force of another.' For example, if all of the felicity
conditions for a "mandate" are present,' 6 5 the illocutionary force of the
directive "Do it" can take the syntactic form of all of the others classes:
Representative: "Fail to do X and see what happens" or "You
must do X."
Expressive: "I'm dead serious about X being done."
Question: "Is there any conceivable excuse for not doing X?"
Declaration: "Anyone who doesn't do X is fired."
Note that the above utterances retain all of the semantic power of the
directive.' 66 In the legal context-and particularly in the tort claims contextthe degree to which these statements are considered directives by the hearer
would depend upon the degree to which the felicity conditions are satisfied, but
that is a question for the trier of fact. 6 1
It should also be noted that unless a particular statute, regulation, or
rule forbids executive action taken in any way other than written form, there is
nothing to say that a governmental mandate cannot be made orally.' 6 1 If a park
service director, speaking ex cathedra about matters within his purview,
verbally orders his staff to do X at a meeting, a mandate has been made if all of
the felicity conditions are met. This imperative could be communicated in any
one of the above-referenced indirect ways. Since indirect speech acts are
perhaps more common to conversation than to handbooks, the occurrence of an
indirect directive is more likely in the situational context of a meeting. But the

164
See John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH
ACTS,
supra note 154, at 59, 71.

165

See supra Part III.A.I.iv.

See supra text accompanying note 126 (defining direct); see also supra text accompanying
notes 134-39 (discussing "advise" group). Also note that the taxonomy set forth in Part III can be
undone by flouting maxims: "I suggest you do it immediately," said by a boss to a subordinate, is
an indirect mandate taking the form of a representative even though it uses one of the most
fundamental "guideline" words.
166

See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the
specificity of the Army Corps of Engineers Manual Safety Plan, and holding that it was specific
and did not allow for discretion). Using the felicity conditions, the trier of fact would determine
whether the Safety Plan was presented to the employees by the proper authority; whether the
Safety Plan was directed toward the proper parties; whether the Safety Plan was properly
enforced; whether the Safety Plan used language that denotes an imperative; whether the Safety
Plan required action; whether the Safety Plan was sufficiently formal; and whether the Safety
Plan predicated that a future course of action be taken. See supra Part III.A. .iv.
168
See, e.g., Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
government could not exercise discretion in maintaining the safe conditions in a grocery store).
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orality of the communication should not, for that very fact alone, disqualify it
from consideration as a mandate.
B. Syntax

Syntax is the branch of linguistics that deals with the construction of
language.' 69 Its contribution to the mandate/guideline analysis comes by way of
the fact that some word groupings, or "collocations," evidence a mandate,1 70
and by way of the fact that certain modalities can change the complexion of an
utterance, turning it from a fairly innocuous statement into a mandate.
1.

Collocations

With regard to the collocation of the mandate, the order of the action
required, who requires it, and who will perform it, are optional:
The Department requires the janitorialstaff to mop the floors
weekly.
The floors will be mopped weekly by the janitorial staff as
requiredby the Department.
The janitorialstaff as required by the Department, will mop
the floors weekly.
Further, a direct mandate may, but need not, be communicated in the
active voice, whereby the agent is shown:
The Agency requires that all employees ...

169
See M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory
Interpretation, 46 U. PITr. L. REv. 373, 383 (1985) ("[A] speaker who violates the rules of
English syntax is, in a sense, not speaking English. Even more clearly, a speaker who attempts to
use English words with different meanings will fail to communicate with a conventional Englishspeaking hearer.").
170
Dr.Wierzbicka makes the points about collocations:

The meaning of a word can often be illuminated by the other words which it
tends to co-occur with. For example, if we compare the adverbs which the
three related verbs, rebuke, reprimandand reprove, tend to co-occur with, we
will obtain important clues to the semantic differences between them ....
Thus rebuking tends to be done sharply whereas reprimanding tends to be
done severely; and neither rebuking nor reprimanding can be done gently. On
the other hand, reproving can be done gently, but cannot be done sharply;
severely is not excluded, but it is less likely to co-occur with reprove than
with reprimand.
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 21.
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A passive voice construction is also possible, suppressing the agent in
favor of highlighting the action:
All employees are requiredto . .
Therefore, the "fronting" of the agent in the articulated mandate can be
implied. As long as the identity of the agent is clear, and as long as the agent
has the requisite power and authority, necessary for the preparatory condition
of a valid mandate,17 1 the expression or suppression of the agent's name is
optional. After all, an employee handbook published by the Arizona
Department of Safety need not express every directive in terms of what "The
Department" insists upon.
But there is less freedom to suppress the addressee in a mandate. The
identity of exactly who it is that must perform the action is a more important
matter. It may be implied, as in the case of an employee handbook given to all
employees, who understand that every directive inside the book applies to
everyone employed; it might even be clear from the context that the unstated
addressee is the concerned party-for example, a member of the janitorial staff
would gather that a directive stating that "all floors will be mopped once a
week" is directed at him; however, the further the locution strays from
specificity-one dimension of the essential condition-the more tenuous is the
argument that it is a mandate rather than a guideline.1 72
This indicates the preeminence of the essential condition in the speech
act analysis. Recognizability is most compromised when the predication-the
"verbness"-of the utterance, is attenuated. Who wants the action done and
who will do the action are more or less required for a mandate's validity,
depending on the context, 73 but what must be done is indispensable, regardless
of context.1 74

'1

See supra Part III.A. Liv.

See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
guidelines in question were not mandatory "because they [did] not tell firefighters how to fight
the fire," and because the guidelines did not address in more specificity what to do in a multiple
fire situation).
'
See supra Part II.A.Lii.
174
The importance of the object, depending upon the intended meaning, is explained this
way:
[Ihf a verb implies that the agent wants to achieve a certain state of affairs
and that the role of the addressee is rather instrumental, then it is the desired
state of affairs, rather than the addressee, which is treated as a direct object.
Hence for example the following contrasts:
he demanded the release of the prisoners
*he asked the release of the prisoners
he asked them to release the prisoners
*he demanded them to release the prisoners[.]
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 25.
172
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2. Modals
Modals are the aspects of language that allow the speaker to attach
expressions of obligation, belief, or attitude to an utterance.17 5 In English, these
modes are often expressed through a small range of verbs: "can," "could,"
"may," "might," "shall," "should," "will," "would," and "ought." 7 6 Such
expressions can also be made lexically (i.e., through phrases, such as "if at all
possible, X will.. ." or "without exception, the use of Y is called for
when. . ."). With regard to the speech act analysis conducted here, the

importance of the modals lies in whether they create an obligation to act in the
fashion prescribed by the main verb, or on the other hand, express something
less than that.
The use of "can" and "could"1" denotes only the ability to do the act or
the possibility of its occurrence, not an obligation to do it:
The Committee can recommend the dissolution of the study in
the event that ....
A snowstorm can precipitate the closure of the park by the
staff
The use of "may" and "might" denote only the discretion to do the act,
not an obligation to do it:
The Committee may recommend the dissolution of the study in
the event that ....
The use of "should" can be used either way,1 78 to denote obligation
(and is synonymous with "shall" in such cases) or to imply suggestion.

175

See Modal Verbs and Their Meaning, My ENGLISH PAGES, http://www.myenglish

pages.com/site-phpfiles/grammar-lesson-modals.php#.VIXSn_21zlJ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016)
(discussing modal verbs and stating that "[t]hey have a great variety of communicative
functions").
176
Id.
177
It is unlikely that "could" or "might" would appear in the form of a governmental
pronouncement, but they are conceivable: "The staff could agree that no action is necessary
when..."; "The agency might look to the data compiled by X when deciding whether...
"Ought" is also a possibility, but would again suggest mere aspiration.
178
The dual, sometimes contradictory, nature of words was analyzed by Sigmund Freud. He
called these terms "primal words." See Sigmund Freud, The Antithetical Meaning of Primal
Words, in WRITINGS ON ART AND LITERATURE (1997). Ethicist P.H. Nowell-Smith called such
terms "Janus" words, since they looked in both directions. See P.H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 100,
223 (1954).
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Although typically "should" is used in the form of a recommendation, the
context of the surrounding words can supply a different meaning :
The Board of Directors should meet four times a year in the
main office of the corporationas opposed to Employees should
make their best efforts to create a welcoming atmosphere for
customers.
The use of "shall" and "will" denote compulsion to do the act, if other
indicators do not contradict them in some way or attenuate the order:
The Committee shall/will meetfour times a year.
The use of "would" in a purported mandate has an attenuating function,
just as in the case of "can," "could," "may," and "might."180 As in the unlikely
use of "could" or "might," the use of "would" weakens the sense of obligation
so much that it becomes more of a guideline, politely stated: The Agency would
like to have all reports by the first of the month. Note that the type of verbs
bound with "would" are in the "Ask" group of speech acts, 18' or are not speech
act verbs at all: "I would ask that you ... I would like for you to . . . ."
However, a rather formal but nevertheless valid mandate could be formed using
"would" in the following way: The Agency would require that all
employees... , emphasizing the will of the Agency in an admittedly
complicated fashion; still, the directive is plain.1 8 2

17
An example, in which the court seems to interpret "should" in the sense of "shall," appears
in a Southern District of Florida case, in which a diplomatic "Letter of Instruction," stated that an
ambassador "should instruct all Executive branch personnel under [the Ambassador's] authority
of their responsibility to keep [the Ambassador] fully informed at all times of their current and
planned activities ..... Couzado v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 691, 694-95 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(emphasis added), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., 105 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 1997). The
court construed the modal "should" in context with the other semantic words belonging to the
"Order" semantic group, such as "require." Id.; see also Garcia v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 2d
1133, 1148-49 (D.N.M. 2010) (discussing the dual nature of "should").
180
Dr. Wierzbicka states:

Speech act verbs differ also from one another in the range of modals which
they can occur with. For example, one can make suggestions of
recommendations using the frames "I would suggest..." and "I would
recommend. . ." But one cannot order, confess or inform using the frames "I
would order you. . .", "I would confess. . ." or "I would inform you." On the
other hand, one can confess or inform-but not suggest or recommendusing the modal must ("I must confess. . .", "I must inform you. . .", "I must
suggest. . .", "I must recommend...").
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 22.
1
For a discussion the "Ask" group of speech acts, see supra Part III.A. 1.v.
182
Dr. Wierzbicka makes the following distinction:
The difference between "I would suggest" and "I would order you..." is
easily explained in terms of meaning, because of the inherent tentativeness of
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The importance of modals to the formation of mandates underscores
the point made above with regard to collocations: mandates affect
recognizability,183 and since recognizability relates to the essential condition of
a felicitous mandate, 1 84 its preeminence is doubly clear.
In summary, pragmatics and syntax play a key role in the
understanding of what mandates and guidelines are at the level of language.
Both the situational context regarding the utterance as well as its basic
construction are the means by which hearers interpret a particular statement as
a mandate or not. Viewed through this linguistic lens, an appreciation of the
variables that contribute to the mandatory nature of a particular utterance is
more acute.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TORT CLAIMS ACTS: FEDERAL AND STATE

Turning to what courts have done when analyzing the question of
whether a statement is a mandate or a guideline, the best articulation of what is
at stake was made by the United States Supreme Court in Berkovitz v. United
States.185 The pronouncement applies to the federal context, but is also
applicable to state tort claims acts.
As described in Berkovitz, to show that a statement is a guideline rather
than a mandate, the government must first prove that "the action is a matter of
choice for the acting employee." 1 8 6 Because "conduct cannot be discretionary
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice," a government employee's
action is not discretionary if "a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow."' 87 Accordingly, the

DFE exception "does not protect the government when it elects not to perform
a duty that a statute or regulation requires it to perform."' 88 Therefore, the first
level of inquiry is whether there is a codified statute or regulation that speaks to

.

suggesting, and forcefulness of ordering. It also seems clear why one doesn't
introduce suggestions in the frame "I must suggest . . .", again because of the
tentativeness of suggesting. But then, why can't orders and commands be
introduced in the frames "I must order you" or "I must command.
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 22-23.
1
See supra Part III.B.1.
184
See supra Part III.A.1.iv.
18

486 U.S. 531 (1988).
Id. at 536.
187
Id. For example, California requires by statute that its hospitals screen for Methicillinresistant staphyllococous aureus (staph infection) in all intensive care units, burn units, dialysis
patients, and patients transferred in from a skilled nursing facility. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1255.8 (West 2012). Failure to follow such a rule would result in a waiver of government
liability under the state's tort claims act, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5, without argument over the
applicability of its discretionary function exception. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 2012).
188
Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 2011 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
186
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the matter in this way.1 89 If so, there is no option in the matter, and failure to
comply with the statute will result in liability for a resulting injury. 190
However, there is an important distinction between regulations that
direct certain behavior, permitting discretion in achieving that behavior, and
regulations that direct a specific course of action to achieve a specific result.19'
As the Court explained in Berkovitz, an action protected by the DFE must
actually be discretionary-or, alternatively, cannot be a mandatory action
prescribed by statute, regulation, or other policy. 1 92
The determination of whether a mandatory directive exists must
depend on "established governmental policy, as express or implied by statute,
regulation, or agency guidelines."' 9 3 In these pronouncements lies the rule that
permits the waiver of liability as per a particular tort claims act-and makes
inapplicable a DFE thereby-when a statement involves a mandate.' 94 The
plaintiff can proceed to his proof because the matter is one relating to whether
the defendant breached his duty to perform the directed action. 9 5
On the other hand, if the statement does not involve a mandate, then
the second prong of the DFE must be examined (i.e., whether the matter
involved was policy related). 19 6 Guidelines are perforce discretionary matters,
and a government defendant who has won the first battle-determining the
nature of the statement to be precatory, not mandatory-creates a presumption
that the matter also involved policy.1 9 7 To reiterate, the stakes of winning the
first prong of a DFE are therefore quite high, in that the plaintiff can go
immediately to proof of injury-always a good position from a tort
perspective.' 9 8 On the other hand, the defendant can proceed to claim essential
matters of policy when the statement is determined to be merely a guideline,

189

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.

190

See id.

See Sutton, 26 F.3d at 908-09 (noting that, while the regulations in question imposed
specific duties on boat operators, they did not specifically mandate any action by the government
entity tasked with enforcing those regulations).
191

192

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.

19
Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 316 (1991)).
194
See id. at 1131 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
195

See Sutton, 26 F.3d. at 908.

See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537 (stating that "the exception, properly construed, therefore
protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy").
1
Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324.
198

See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (stating that "the discretionary function exception will not

apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss3/5

34

Harmon: "Should" or "Must"?: Distinguishing Mandates from Guidlines in To
"SHOULD" OR "MUST"?

2016]

1041

suggestive in nature only (and by implication, open to interpretation as to how
the suggestion should be accomplished). 9 9
In the following pages, the analysis categorizes various cases, both
federal and state, in terms of the felicity conditions for mandates set out above.
In other words, the holdings in these opinions are based on principles that
square with the felicity conditions, in that the particular governmental
statement (1) was or was not from the right party or to the right party
(Preparatory Condition); (2) was or was not in the proper form, was or was not
specific enough, or does or does not use mandatory language (Essential
Condition); or (3) was or was not enforced or treated as a mandate by the
parties in question (Perlocutionary Effect, refuting Sincerity Condition). 200 All
of the conditions must be met, but as will be seen, the vast majority of cases in
the area turn upon matters relating to the essential condition-the
recognizability of the mandate. 20 1 As such, cases involving the matters related
to the preparatory and sincerity conditions will be dealt with first.
A.

PreparatoryCondition: The Speaker and the Audience

As set forth above, the speech act preparatory condition for a valid
mandate would concern things that are pre-utterance, namely, that the parties
involved must be relevant to the act. A mandate can only be spoken by a party
with the authority to give it, and can only be addressed to one in a place to act
upon it.2 0 2 Cases involving this component of mandate/guideline analysis
include a seminal opinion in the area handed down by the Supreme Court, as
well as an important pronouncement made by the First Circuit.2 0 3
In a significant declaration, the Supreme Court stated in United States
v. Gaubert that whether an action is mandatory or discretionary depends upon
"the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor." 204 Consequently,
discretionary action is not confined to individuals in management positions. 20 5
The day-to-day management of a business requires discretionary action to the
same extent as "policymaking or planning functions"; so the distinction

19
See Sutton, 26 F.3d at 909-10 (holding that the government could exercise the discretion
when deciding whether to enforce "the various provisions of the system of boater control"
provided in the regulations, and therefore, the court could move on to the next prong to determine
whether the decision not to post the warning sign was grounded in policy).
200
See supra Part III.A.L.iv. The propositional content condition is not in question in these
cases.
201
See infra Part IV.C.
202
See supra Part III.A.L.iv.
203

See infra notes 204, 213.

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)).
204

205

Id.
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between actions at the managerial level and actions at the operational level was
held to be invalid for the purposes of determining the nature of the action as
mandatory or discretionary. 2 06
However, the Court's statement in Gaubert is more nuanced than it
might first appear. 2 07 While it is true that the act of exercising discretion-the
balancing and weighing that makes something a matter of judgment-is
something that can be done on the day-to-day, operational level just as much as
at the management stage, such an acknowledgement is not a judicial refutation
of the preparatory condition.208 Rather, the point the Court makes relates to the
performance of the discretion;20 9 it is not a pronouncement on who can make
the rule. Anyone at any level may be required to exercise discretion, but only
the proper party can make the rule. 2 10 As such, the preparatory condition is
observed.2 11
The Court's understanding of this point is highlighted in a 1998 First
Circuit opinion, in which the plaintiff claimed that the testimony as to the
mandatoriness of a rule should be allotted significant weight in determining the
212
issue.22 The First Circuit's assessment is clear:
The most obvious reason why such sources command less
weight is because it matters who speaks. To determine what is
agency policy, courts customarily defer to the statements of the
official policymaker, not others, even though the others may
occupy important agency positions. This case is a suitable
vehicle for application of the principle. Congress has the legal
authority to render a function either discretionary or obligatory,
and it has delegated that power to the Secretary, not to OSHA's
area directors or compliance officers. Hence, we decline to
accord decretory significance to the area director's or
compliance officers' thoughts on OSHA policy requirements,
especially when the plaintiff insists on interpreting this
testimony in a manner contrary to both the express statements
of Congress and the agency's institutional pronouncements.2 13

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

See id.
See id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813).
210
See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-14.
211
See supra Part III.A.I1iv (defining the preparatory condition as one requiring that the
mandate be spoken by the proper party and directed at the proper party).
212
See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 164 (1st Cir. 1998).
213
Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Irving court cited Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 144 (1991), which held that
"where... the relevant regulations are ambiguous, a reviewing court must defer to the
209

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss3/5

36

Harmon: "Should" or "Must"?: Distinguishing Mandates from Guidlines in To
2016]

"SHOULD" OR "MUST"?

1043

As the court says, "it matters who speaks."2 14 W le testimony as to
interpretation and usage are relevant, which the court acknowledges, they do
not trump an express iteration of a rule or pose a challenge to the authority of
the rule maker.2 15 It is never the case that a valid mandate can be made by one
without the proper authority; nor can the converse be true: that a mandate
communicated to the wrong party (i.e., one who does not have the power to
carry it out) is valid.216 In other words, the proper audience is as important as
the proper speaker.
An illustration of this point is found in Couzado v. United States.2 1 In
Couzado, the United States government conducted a covert sting operation
through the controlled delivery of a cocaine shipment.2 18 Neither the flight
crew, the passengers, nor the customs agents or Ambassador in Belize, where
the flight made a stopover, were informed of the operation. 2 19 The cocaine was
discovered in Belize, and the crew members and passengers spent eleven days
in jail; they sued the government as a result. 2 20 The Southern District of Florida
made a point that the Ambassador's staff were all aware of notification
requirements in an express policy; the court held that the non-observance of
that policy breached a mandate.22 1
This point resonates with those pertaining to the sincerity condition, the
requirement that for a valid mandate, the utterance must be made in earnest.
B. Sincerity Condition: Custom and Usage
As stated above, the sincerity condition for a mandate relates to the
earnestness with which the utterance is made.22 2 The sincerity of the expression
is important in that it can be challenged by proof of contrary action. Again, as

Commission's reasonable interpretation rather than the Secretary's interpretation, since Congress
intended to delegate to the Commission the normal complement of adjudicative powers
possessed by traditional administrative agencies, including the power to 'declare' the law"; and
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, US. Department of Labor v. Eastern
Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1995), which held that the courts will "give
judicial deference to the Director, as policymaker, rather than to the Board, which is purely an
adjudicator."
214
Irving, 162 F.3d at 166.
215
Id.
216
See id.; see also supra Part III.A. .iv.
217
883 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., 105 F.3d 1389
(11th Cir. 1997).
218
Id. at 692.
219
Id.
220

221
222

Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 694.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 5

1044

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

stated above, the sincerity of an utterance is in question, and the felicitous
quality of the act compromised, by evidence that the act did not have the
requisite perlocutionary effect. That is, evidence that the mandate was not
treated as a mandate by the parties would go some ways towards refuting the
argument that it was, in fact, a mandate.22 3
This point can be restated by means of another semantic feature of
verbs, the nature of which reveals, but does not confirm, a particular mental or
emotional state. Some verbs are "stative" in nature, as opposed to "dynamic," 224
in that through their expression the speaker is revealing a state of being rather
than denoting an action. 22 5 Johnfixes cars, expresses a state in the world that
John enjoys-that of car repairman-whereas Johnfixes cars Monday through
Fridayexpresses the dynamic action of actually fixing cars.226
Further, a particular type of stative verb, sometimes called a "mental
227
verb,"
reveals something about the mental (strictly speaking) or emotional
(more broadly speaking) state of the speaker.228 I know he's the best man for
the job expresses the speaker's professed belief. I believe there's hope for him
professes a confidence in the object. But in neither of these last two cases can
the hearer objectively confirm what the speaker actually "knows" or
"believes." 229 The veracity of the statement is known only to the speaker (even
then, he might be delusional). Any refutation of such a statement would have to
come by way of circumstantial evidence as to the speaker's true knowledge and
true belief.230
In much the same way, the effect of a particular utterance-how it is
treated by both the speaker and the audience-can be evidence as to whether it
was sincerely meant as a mandate, or was rather taken as merely a guideline.
"Custom and usage" has always been a means by which ambiguities
can be resolved, even if it is not the first line of inquiry. 1 As the California

223

See supra Part III.A. I.iii.

224

ROBERT I. BINNICK, TIME AND THE VERB: A GUIDE TO TENSE AND ASPECT 183-84 (1991).

225

Id. at 183.
See id. at 183-84.
227
See generally Carl Nils Johnson & Michael P. Maratsos, Early Comprehension of Mental
Verbs: Think and Know, 48 CHILD DEv. 1743 (1977) (discussing children's understanding of the
mental verbs "know" and "think").
228
See generally id.
229
See id. at 1744-47 (discussing the results of an experiment with three and four year-olds
who knew where a hidden object was located, and who thought that they knew where it was
located).
230
See id. (discussing the responses of children when asked why they thought a hidden object
was under "Box B" rather than under "Box A" and vice versa).
231
See Carey Can., Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1556-58 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(resolving contractual ambiguities by looking to custom and usage). But see 12 SAMUEL
226
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appellate court put it: "[R]equisite standards of certainty can [often] be fleshed
out from otherwise vague statutory language by reference to any of the
following sources: (1) long established or commonly accepted usage; (2) usage
at common law; (3) judicial interpretations of the statutory language or of
similar language; or (4) legislative history or purpose."2 32
A representative case, in which matters that pertain to the sincerity
condition of a mandate, is discussed in the First Circuit opinion, Kelly v. United
States.23 3 There the court identifies the proper inquiry, then proceeds to analyze
the customary treatment of the rule in question as evidence relevant to a
determination of its nature:
We recently wrote that, in regard to the first part of the
discretionary function test, "the proper inquiry must center on
the amount of discretion actually held and exercised by the
government employees whose actions or omissions are at
issue." Here, the record reveals without contradiction that (1)
DEA officials consistently regarded regional managers as
possessing discretion in handling unsubstantiated rumors, and
(2) such discretion was actually and consistently exercised at
the regional level. Kelly, a veteran agent, could have contested
this interpretation of the regulations by evidence of contrary
practice, but offered none. Instead, he relied solely on the letter
of the regulations-language which, while perhaps suggestive,
was at the very least a mixed bag, interweaving imperatives
with weaker, precatory verbs and generalities more
characteristic of discretion than of mandatory directives.
Standing alone, this was not enough.2
Note that the court focuses upon the way the rule was "regarded" by the
audience, and upon the way the discretion was "actually and consistently"
exercised. 2 35 Both the perception of the audience as to the discretionary nature
of the utterance in question, and the real and persistent treatment of the
utterance, are key in deciding that the utterance was a guideline, not a
mandate.2 36

§ 34:7 (4th ed. 2012)
(rejecting resort to custom and usage when contract is unambiguous).
232
People v. Nguyen, 161 Cal. App. 3d 687, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting Sechrist v. Mun. Court, 64 Cal. App. 3d 737, 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
233
See 924 F.2d 355, 360-62 (1st Cir. 1991).
234
Id. at 360 (emphasis added) (citing Irving v. United States, 909 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir.
1990)).
235
Id.
236
See id.; see also supra Part III.A. 1.iii.
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
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Further, the court states that this evidence could have been rebutted by
"evidence of contrary practice, but [the plaintiff] offered none."237 The rationale
is clear: how the statement is treated-its reception and enforcement-is
evidence of its nature.2 3 8 In fact, the court privileges this evidence over
evidence as to the language itself, at least in a case in which there is a mixture
of "imperatives with weaker, precatory verbs and generalities." 23 9 Thus, the
court takes the perlocutionary effect of the statement as evidence of its
sincerity/intention. 24 0
In Garcia v. United States, 2 4 1 the district court of New Mexico stated
that it would consult testimony of the parties as to the meaning of the modal
"should" in a police department's standard operating procedures:
Section 2-03-3, which states circumstances under which an
off-duty officer "should not" engage in certain conduct, might
be construed more strictly in practice than the language
suggests. Some might consider the word "should" to be
permissive, granting discretion, while others might consider it
to exhibit a mandatory obligation .... The Court believes that
testimony of the witnesses in the upcoming trial will aid the
Court in determining the meaning of the Isleta SOPs § 2-032.242
In this case, the interpretation by way of custom and usage would inform how
the statement was understood-"intended"--or in other words, "sincerely
meant." 243 Note that the evidence produced by the sincerity condition, as
illustrated in such instances, relates to interpretation of purpose, and not
necessarily to veracity. 244 Again, evidence of how the speaker means the
statement to be taken, and how the audience understands it to be taken, is all
that can be offered to determine purpose. To hold that there is no evidence that
the speaker meant the statement to be taken as he claims is not to charge him
with a falsehood, but only to say that he cannot substantiate his claim. 24 5

237
238
239
240

Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360.
See id.
Id.
See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.iii.

709 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D.N.M. 2010).
Id. at 1148-49. The court went on to quote Kelly v. United States as to the importance of
the amount of discretion "actually held and exercised." Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360.
243
See Garcia, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49.
244
See id.
245
See Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 324-25 (D. Mass. 1999)
(using correspondence between agency members to interpret a piece of legislation that
"interw[ove] precatory with quasi-mandatory language").
241

242
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Although this type of evidence is granted a degree of deference, courts
have also insisted that it give place to other evidence when it exists. In Irving v.
United States, the court made a statement relating both to circumstantial,
"anecdotal" evidence of usage (that which is relevant to the sincerity condition
inquiry) as well as to evidence that came by way of more formal
pronouncements (form being an aspect of the essential condition):
Although we do not suggest that those items invariably will be
the exclusive sources for determining established policy, it
bears remembering that the Court's recognition that informal
rules may be a relevant source took place against a background
understanding, both in administrative law generally and in the
OSHA context specifically, that agencies typically make
authoritative informal statements of policy positions through
published interpretive rules or enforcement guidelines.
Although anecdotal testimony sometimes may furnish clues
regarding the nature of agency policy, it is usually a last-ditch
resort. 246
The court went on to say that even the plaintiffs "anecdotal" evidence of usage
was suspect when offered as proof of the mandatoriness of the statement.
The evidence the plaintiff used in support of its argument was the following
testimony, consisting of an exchange between plaintiff's counsel and the
OSHA Area Director:

Q. And, by the way, the obligation and procedure of your
department is to note and cite specific violations, is it not?
A. To note-document and-identify and document specific
hazards, yes.
Q. Machine by machine by machine?
A. As far as we can see.
Q. Hazard by hazard by hazard?
A. As can be observed. 4 8
The court stated that nowhere in this testimony is there indication of a
policy to inspect every machine. 24 9 In other words, any machine inspected had
to be thoroughly inspected, but not every machine had to be inspected. 2 50 The
court said this indicated a discretionary guideline, not a mandate: "[a]t the very
least, there must be an indication in the record that the witness demonstrated his
awareness of the agency's formal policy statements, but nevertheless had some
246

Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

247

Id.
Id.

248
249
250

Id. at 167.
Id.
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other articulable basis that supported his understanding of agency policy." 251
Here, the court implies that had there been articulable evidence of an
understanding contrary to the formal statement, it would have been
considered.252 The weight given to the circumstantial evidence is, as always,
subject to its credibility.25 3
The "custom and usage" argument finds an analogy in basic estoppel
arguments, such as the "government knowledge inference" defense in false
claims actions.254 In that area, evidence that the government knew of and
acquiesced in the payment of claims submitted by the defendant is an answer to
a charge that the defendant submitted a false claim. In short, the government
cannot lead the defendant into a belief that its claims are valid, then turn around
and charge the defendant with fraud for making the claims.255
Of course, the efficacy of such a defense turns upon how much the
government knew, from which sources it knew it, the cooperativeness of the
defendant in the process, the timing of the events, etc.,256 but that is the case
with any claim of estoppel.2 57 In the DFE context, a defendant claiming that an
alleged mandate was never enforced, or better yet, was deliberately made
superfluous, would mount a more persuasive argument against its mandatory
nature than if events proved otherwise. 25 8 In light of the Irving court's
pronouncement, such arguments would have a difficult time standing up
against a clearly written specific mandate made by the proper party.259

251

Id.
See id.
253
See id. at 166-67 (stating that circumstantial evidence may be given weight in some
instances).
254
See 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM ACTIONS § 2.06 (4th ed. 2014).
255
See United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 957 (10th Cir. 2008).
256
See id. at 951-54.
257
See, e.g., John W. Lundquist, "They Knew What We Were Doing": The Evolution of the
Criminal Estoppel Defense, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 843, 855-61 (1997) (discussing the
government's knowledge requirement when the defendant invokes the defense of criminal
estoppel).
258
See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was
not a mandate for inspectors to implement safety regulations because they could choose to either
do so or not).
259
See supra notes 234-41. The Irving Court went on to say: "Where, as here, the statute and
the applicable regulations clearly speak to the nature of the conduct, there is no occasion to
consult informal rules." Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 165 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Kelly
v. United States, 924 F.2d. 355, 360 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that "[a] regulation which
straightforwardly strips all discretion might well be beyond the reach of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a),
even if ignored in practice").
252
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Essential Condition: Form, Language, Specificity

By far, the condition by which the mandate/guideline determination is
judged most is the essential condition-those things that make the mandate
recognizable as a mandate. The aspects of this condition relate to the form that
the mandate takes, the words with which it is communicated, and the degree of
detail into which it goes in that conveyance.
1.

Form

When speaking of "form," the question revolves around the method or
means by which the alleged rule has been communicated.260 Obviously, a more
"formal" expression would be one that indicates the gravity of the utterance and
the seriousness with which it is intended.26 1 In this way, form is also somewhat
indicative of the sincerity condition.262 After all, an unmistakable communique
from on high is not only understood to be what it is, but is understood to be the
earnest desire of the communicator. Note also that a communication can obtain
a good part of its formality by means of the person making it, which resonates
with the preparatory condition.263 The head of an agency who makes a
pronouncement lends a degree of solemnity to even a spoken communication
that a lesser functionary cannot. 2 64 All this is to say that a particular fact can
contribute to more than one felicity condition.
Evidence that the courts have picked up on this aspect of the
mandate/guideline determination is exemplified in a number of cases. For
example, in Tam v. United States,2 65 as evidence that the Forestry Service was
negligent in managing an ice cave recreational area, the plaintiff offered a set of
what the district court nominated "planning or policy documents." 26 6 The court
not only held that the language in the documents was discretionary in nature,
but also that "[the] documents do not rise to the level of specific mandates
See, e.g., Camozzi v. Rolald/Miller and Hope Consulting Grp., 866 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that "a failure to effectuate policy choices already made and incorporated in the
contracts" did not involve discretion). In the given case, the mandate took the form of a contract.
See id.
261
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 165-66 (holding that there is no need to consult informal rules
when formal rules are available, and that informal rules are the last resort in determining the
nature of the conduct).
262
See supra Parts III.A. liv, IV.B (explaining sincerity condition).
263
See, e.g., Irving,,.162 F.3d at 166 (stating that "it matters who speaks"); see also supra
260

Parts III.A. 1. iv, IV.A. (explaining preparatory conditions).
264
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 166 ("To determine what is agency policy, courts customarily defer
to the statements of the official policymaker, not others, even though the others may occupy
important agency positions.").
265

905 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2012).

266

Id. at 1232-33.
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directing a course of action under step one of the discretionary function
exception. Both the [documents] are recommendations by a planning
committee, not required mandates." 2 67 The fact that the alleged rules were made
by a "planning committee" also took them afoul of the preparatory condition, in
that they were not made by an authoritative body. 2 68

In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit in Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest
Research Foundation, Inc.26 9 reviewed a group of letters exchanged between
individuals employed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Division of
Biology and Medicine discussing medical and safety issues concerning
biological experiments conducted on inmates. 2 70 The court held that "sporadic
communications, made by individuals of varying levels of importance to the
operation of the experiments, cannot constitute a blanket regulation
constraining the Government's operations." 27 1 Here, not only was the form too
casual, but the sporadic means by which it was sent indicated that the utterance
was merely suggestive, not mandatory, in nature. 272
The reasoning in a First Circuit case resonates with both the
preparatory condition and the essential condition. In Irving v. United States, a
case in which the lower court looked only at formal pronouncements by an
agency to determine mandatoriness, the appellate court acknowledged that
though more casual, oral pronouncements can prove to be mandates; they are
not at the foremost in the list of considerations.2 73 The implication is that all
things being equal, the more formal the expression, the more apt the courts are
to find a mandate.274 This disposition accounts for a finding by the Ninth
Circuit that a procedural handbook, which contained a statement that "all
complaints of alleged hazards . . . must be evaluated," issued by the Mine
Safety and Health Administration, included mandates, not mere guidelines.275
The formality of the official handbook in which the pronouncement appeared
influenced the court's determination of the pronouncement's nature.

267

Id. at 1233.

268

Id.

269

339 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 945.
Id. at 945-46.
Id.; see supra Part III.A. 1iv (explaining essential conditions).
Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir. 1998).

270
271

272
273

See Bibeau, 339 F.3d at 945-46; Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 59
(1st
Cir. 2002); Irving, 162 F.3d at 166.
275
Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 43
(2005), remanded to 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006).
274
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The district court of Massachusetts, in Burnashov v. F/V Oceanview,
Inc.,276 also rejected the argument that information in a certain kind of
document could amount to a directive:
The documents cited by Oceanview, such as the nautical charts
and DOD Manual, are not mandatory directives. "Because a
mariner cannot reasonably rely solely on a chart, nautical
charts do not induce reliance such that the government has a
duty to ensure their accuracy, especially where the government
specifically directs mariners to other publications through
warnings or cautions on the chart itself." 2
In other words, the kind of information in this type of document could not be a
directive by itself, as the conduct under question relied on consulting other
publications.27 8
It is seldom that the courts hold on the grounds of form alone, which is
perhaps a function of the fact that the means of communication are often
accompanied by other aspects of the essential condition.279 One of those aspects
relates to language. The nature of the very wording used has proven a large part
of judicial analysis.
2. Language
Judging by the number of times courts have based their holding upon
it, a determinative factor in the mandate/guideline analysis is the type of
language that the purported rule includes. 2 80 The verbs in the taxonomy set out
in Part III above, along with the modals discussed in that same part, figure
prominently in the court's assessment of the issue here.
Often, the clarity of a mandate turns upon the use of either an "Order"
or "Ask" verb.281 In these cases, the evidence yielded by a "plain reading" of
the rule's text leads to the determination.282 In Faber v. United States,28 the

978 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2013).
Id. at 82-83 (citing Limar Shipping Ltd. v. United States, 324 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003)).
278
See id.
279
See cases cited supra notes 274-75.
280
See, e.g., Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Franklin Say.
Corp. v. United States, 970 F. Supp. 855, 866 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that "Regulations
requiring that agency employees 'comprehensively and objectively weigh alternative actions,'
and 'ensure that asset integrity and value are maintained,' hardly constitute the type of
'specifically prescribed courses of action' necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction under the
FTCA").
276
277

281

See supra Part III.A.v.

282

See, e.g., Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1995).

283

Id.
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Ninth Circuit held that a park's management plan requiredthe Forest Service
"to 'intensify management' at the Falls by 1) developing a sign plan, 2)
formulating an on-going media pro'ram, and 3) providing a presence at the
Falls to verbally warn the public." 84 As such, there was no choice in the
matter, and the DFE did not apply.2 85 Similarly, in Couzado v. United States,
the Southern District of Florida held language to the effect that "DEA
representatives were required to coordinate with the Embassy Narcotics
Coordinator all sensitive or unusual DEA activities conducted in-country," to
notify U.S. embassies in certain countries of proposed flight plans, and to keep
the Ambassador informed of certain matters.8 6 Accordingly, there was no
"element of choice" involved in the matter, which made the rule a mandate.287
In Olson v. United States, "require" was also used in the Mine Safety
and Health Administration's procedures handbook that requiredthe agency to
"make inspections of each underground coal or other mine in its entirety at
least four times a year."288 The Ninth Circuit held the policy to be mandatory.
Non-compliance with its directive was deemed negligence unprotected by the
DFE.29 0
However, while these cases use words from the taxonomy set out
above, other instances finding a mandate illustrate that directives can be formed
by other words when they are put in the imperative mood. 2 9' They can also be
weakened to mere guidelines by the use of some kind of lexical attenuation,
which weakens the force of the statement by use of conditional terms. 2 92 In
Autery v. United States,29 3 the Eleventh Circuit held that a letter to the Park
Service to the effect that "[b]lack locust trees are short-lived and due to decay

Id. at 1126 (emphasis added).
285
Id.
286
883 F. Supp. 691, 694-95 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (emphasis added).
287
Id. at 695.
288
Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 43 (2005).
289
Id. at 1239-40.
290
Id. But see Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2009). In Freeman, the
Fifth Circuit contextualized the passive use of the verb "require" in the expression "[m]edical
support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points" by pointing
out that "[t]he ostensibly mandatory language 'is required,' when read in light of the broad goals
of the Annex ... did nothing more than explain the needs that arise in an emergency." Id. The
court concluded that "[s]atisfaction of those needs was a broad, implied goal allowing for
significant choice in its implementation by federal agencies." Id.
291
See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
language "[d]angerous terrain conditions, such as drop-offs, . . . will be properly marked or
fenced" specifically prescribed the course of action for the employees to follow and did not allow
for discretion).
292
See Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993).
293
Id.
284
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(following borer activity), break up and drop limbs and tops. Avoid them in
new areas; remove them when possible in existing areas," did not create a
mandate.2 94 The order "to remove" the trees was conditional upon "possibility"
and therefore was merely a guideline.295
At times, lexical attenuation of an alleged mandate can come by means
of providing examples.296 Words that undo specificity by opening something up
to an array of choices leads to the interpretation that the alleged rule was only a
guideline.297 For example, in Ard v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp.,298 the
United States District Court for the Central District of California determined a
claim that the FDIC had "certain articulated duties," such as a duty "to identify,
monitor, and address risks to deposit insurance funds," was insufficient to
establish a mandatory action because it was not specifically prescribed by any
regulation, statute, or policy. 2 99 However, the Ninth Circuit in Navarette v.
United States 00 held that a checklist specifically identifying the types of things
that qualified under a general term established a mandate, despite the use of
general language about goals and objectives. The particular language in
question was: "[d]angerous terrain conditions, such as drop-offs, etc., will be
properly marked or fenced." 301
Modals are the means by which a statement's mandatory or precatory
nature is most often established. 3 0 2 In Pelham v. United States, 303 the district
court of New Jersey found a mandate when:
The contract unequivocally state[d] that "[t]he Contracting
Officer will notify the contractor of noncompliance with these
requirements." Thus, through use of the word "will," the
contract clearly accords the contracting officer with oversight
responsibilities over the contractor's final compliance
294

Id. at 1528-30.

295

Id. at 1525.

See, e.g., Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
Management Guidelines' broad mandate to warn the public of 'special hazards' through
educational materials, brochures, pamphlets, and the like necessarily encompasses an element of
discretion in identifying such hazards.").
297
See id.
298
770 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
299
Id. at 1033, 1036.
300
500 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2007).
301
Id. at 917-18. Courts have also found that language merely instructive in nature is not a
mandate. In FranklinSavings Corp. v. United States, language to the effect that the party should
"take the necessary steps," charging the party with certain tasks, "among other things," and
directing sales based on a variety of factors, was too precatory in nature to amount to a directive.
180 F.3d 1124, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1999).
302
See cases cited infra notes 305-06.
303
661 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.J. 1987).
296
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obligation. While the contracting officer's implementation of
an inspection program for detecting safety breaches may be
discretionary, once the officer suspects a safety deficiency, he
or she does not have discretion as to whether or not act upon
it.

Similarly, the Eastern District Court of California held that a safety policy
indicating "[r]egular inspection of work areas and visitor-use areas shall be
completed and documented," that "[a]ll employees shall correct hazards," and
that "[a]ll facilities . .. shall be designed with adopted national standard, codes,
and guidelines" was mandatory.30 s On the other hand, the District Court of
Oregon held that fire control policies did not specifically mandate any course of
action when they used the conditional "may" to suggest conduct.306
However, the use of the typically mandatory modal "shall" has not
always been found determinative. In Sierra Club v. Train,307 the Fifth Circuit
took a wider view of a statutory rule, consulting its legislative history, among
other things, to determine the mandatoriness of its nature:
The most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent is the
wording of the statute. Upon "superficial examination," §
1319(a)(3)'s statutory language "shall" appears to clearly
mandate that § 1319(a)(3) imposes a non-discretionary duty on
the EPA Administrator. Use of the word "shall" generally
indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to
the contrary is made. Such an argument may be waged when
extrinsic aids such as the purpose of the statute, the statute as a
whole, or the legislative history indicates an intention that the
statute be given a discretionary effect. Although a salutary rule
of statutory construction prohibits resort to extrinsic aids when
a statute on its face appears to be clear and unambiguous, we
heed a caution which has been repeated with specific reference
to the FWPCAA of 1972 that "(W)hen aid to construction of
the meaning of the words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use,

Id. at 1069 (citations omitted).
Botell v. United States, No. 2:1 1-cv-01545-TLN-GGH, 2013 WL 3941004, at *2-3, 6-7
(E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013) (emphasizing the use of the word "shall" throughout the policy to
conclude that it was a mandatory policy); see also Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853, 855 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that "shall" established a mandate); Dugard v. United States, No. 3:11 -cv04718-CTB, 2013 WL 6228625 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (finding six mandates inter alia, on
grounds that include the use of the modal "shall"); Elson v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr.
305, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the modal "shall" established a mandate in a Public
Utilities Code).
306
McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1234-37 (D. Or. 2002).
307
557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).
304
305
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The court went on to look not only at the legislative history, but also at the
administrative agency's interpretation of its rule-in this case, the EPA.309
Since the agency itself construed the rule as merely discretionary, absent
evidence that such a construction was contrary to legislative intent, that
interpretation was allowed. 31 0 Above all, a main reason that the court construed
the rule as discretionary, despite the clear use of the obligatory "shall," was that
"where the result of one interpretation is unreasonable, while the result of
another interpretation is logical, the latter should prevail."31 1 The court held that
the reading suggested by the plaintiff would lead to an untenable set of actions
by the Agency-in this instance, forcing the issuance of abatement orders that
would amount to nothing more than empty gestures.3 12
Using a similar rationale, the First Circuit in Kelly v. United States held
that the use of the modals "will" and "must" could not be interpreted as
requiring the Drug Enforcement Agency's Office of Internal Security to
conduct an internal investigation, regardless of how spurious a report of wrongdoing was judged to be.3 t Such an interpretation would frustrate the very
objective that the law was meant to achieve:
Although words like "will" and "must" are generally of
mandatory effect, they may have other meanings and may be
used, as here, in merely a directory sense. Moreover, both the
heading of section 8121 and its lead sentence indicate that the
prescribed obligations are triggered only when the DEA
official in question receives "an allegation or complaint"
concerning an employee. Although neither noun is defined in
the Manual, we believe that, under common usage, it was
permissible for the agency to interpret "allegation" and
"complaint" as not encompassing mere buzznacking. Put
308
Id. at 489 (citing Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10
(1976)); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977)) (citations omitted); see also
Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 1394, 1399-1400 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding a procedure
discretionary despite use of the modal "shall").
309
Sierra Club, 557 F.2d at 489.
310
Id. The Court went on to say that the legislative history of the statute was rife with
dissension over whether the rule involved was a mandate or a guideline. Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490 (quoting C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (4th ed.
31

1973)).
Id. at 490-91; see also Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 339 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500-01 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the word "'shall' in
describing responsibilities ... does not necessarily . . . [leave] no room .. . to exercise choice or
judgment. . . ")).
313
Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360-61 (1st Cir. 1991).
312
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another way, reading the words as giving DEA's regional
managers discretion to determine what comprised an
"'allegation" or "complaint" was a plausible rendition of the
overall text, well within the purview of the regulation. 314
The court went on to say that:
If the Manual were read to mandate that every bit of idle gossip
intimating employee misconduct had to be reported, it would
constitute an open invitation to drug traffickers to make
baseless claims against DEA agents. The legitimate business of
the agency would grind to a halt, its limited resources diverted
to the needless investigation of its own agents rather than the
war against drugs.315

An alternative rationale consistent with the court's reasoning here is that the
plaintiffs interpretation of what amounts to an "allegation" or "complaint"
would be unreasonable.3 16 If every call, regardless of its credibility, were taken
to be an "allegation" or "complaint," then the statutory purpose of investigating
corruption would be frustrated by spending valuable resources to review
obvious falsehoods. 1 In other words, this is not so much a question of whether
the Agency is required to investigate allegations and complaints; they are so
required, just as the language states.3 1 8 It is just that some things do not amount
to allegations and complaints. 1 Perhaps in this point is a tacit, unstated
admission that there is some judgment involved in the application of every rule,
at least insofar as those charged with its execution must determine whether the
variables it concerns are extant. 3 2 0 For example, a federal cleaning service
charged with the mandate to "lock all doors upon leaving the building," must

Id. (citations omitted); see also Lopez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, 455 Fed.
Appx. 427, 433 (5th Cir. 2011) ("That the USMS documents here in question state what the
USMS 'will' do is far from dispositive; 'will' may be used to express a determination to commit
a future act as easily as a command to perform that act.").
31s
Kelly, 924 F.2d at 361. In language mirroring that of Sierra Club v. Train, the Court said
that "an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference and will
ordinarily be accorded controlling weight unless clearly erroneous." Id. (citing Sierra Club, at
489). This is of course in accordance with Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
316
See Sierra Club, 557 F.2d at 490 (quoting SANDS, supranote 311, § 45.12).
317
See Kelly, 924 F.2d at 361.
314

See id. at 360-61.
See id. (holding that "the prescribed obligations are triggered only when the DEA official
in question receives 'an allegation or complaint' concerning an employee").
320 See, e.g., id. (stating that the agency charged with the duty to execute a regulation could
exercise discretion determining whether such a duty arose in the first place by distinguishing
complaints/allegations from mere gossip).
3

319

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss3/5

50

Harmon: "Should" or "Must"?: Distinguishing Mandates from Guidlines in To

2016]

"SHOULD" OR "MUST"?

1057

first determine whether they are open or not before any question of
mandatoriness even comes into play.
Sometimes a purported rule includes both mandatory and precatory
language. In that event, other indicators break the tie-particularly, the
specificity with which the prescribed actions are set out. 32 1 In Greene v. United
States,3 22 the Eastern District of California held that a set of building standards
was mandatory because it used language such as "requires," "maximum
extent," and "shall comply." 3 23 An exception for "feasibility"-indicating that
the government need not comply with the building codes if it was impossible to
do so-did not make the policy discretionary.324 On the other hand, in Terbush
v. United States, 325 the Ninth Circuit stated that the existence of some
mandatory language does not eliminate discretion when an objective's broader
goals require an element of discretion.326 Therefore, it seems that the broader
context-which requires weiqhing, balancing, and judgment calls--can
override mandatory language. 27 However, an "escape-hatch" clause that
attempts to make everything ultimately discretionary will not necessarily undo
a list of directives made with "Order" verbs and mandatory modals. Such was
the case in Navarette v. United States, where an attempt to diffuse the

See cases cited infra note 326.
322
207 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
323
Id. at 1118, 1121.
324
Id. at 1120-22. In Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, the alleged rule involved a mixture
of precatory and mandatory language. 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 324-25 (D. Mass. 1999). The court
held that the situation permitted it to consult "informal indicia" in the form of correspondence to
interpret a statement that "no substance known to be, or suspected of being . . harmful ...
should be given to human beings .. . without informed consent." Id. The evidence pointed to a
mandate, which made the DFE inapplicable. Id.
325
516 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
326
Id. at 1139-40; see also Lopez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 455 Fed.
Appx. 427,
433 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Freeman v. United States, 455 F.3d 326, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)) ("As
this court has found, many policy statements couched in seemingly mandatory language
ultimately present only 'generalized precatory or aspirational language that is too general to
prescribe a specific course of action for an agency or employee to follow."'); Franklin Say. Corp.
v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1999) ("None of the four constitutes a
'specific and mandatory requirement' as this court's precedents define that term. Instead, they all
state general goals, or sets of objectives to balance, in precatory rather than mandatory
language."); Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a procedure
involving the undertaking of a series of steps in order to make a decision did not constitute a
particularized course of action); Singh v. S. Asian Soc'y of George Washington Univ., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 1394, 1400 (D.
Kan. 1997)) (holding that the use of "predominantly precatory language" invested discretion, not
obligation, in the decision maker).
327
See cases cited supra note 326.
321
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specificity of a checklist by including some general terms was held to be an
ineffective attempt to preserve discretion.3 28
In summary, courts will take into consideration the purpose of the
alleged rule, as well as its broader objectives and context, despite the tenor of
the words used-whether they be mandatory words or precatory words.
However, by and large, the semantic value of the verbs, 329 as well as that of the
modals used, are honored when the terms are clear.
3.

Specificity

By far, the degree of specificity involved is the most determinative of
the three aspects of the essential condition used by courts to determine whether
a statement is a mandate or a guideline. 3 30 The other two aspects, form and
language, play their roles, but the number of times courts have based their
holding on matters of detail dwarfs all others. Indeed, the importance of
specificity to mandates is fundamentally constitutive of them.
The courts have long said that the DFE will not apply if the statement
in question is specific: "a general regulation or policy ... does not remove
discretion unless it specifically prescribes a course of conduct." 3 3 1 If the alleged
rule consists of nothing more than broad generalities and high aspirations,
without expressly and directly explaining how those aspirations are to take
place, it remains at the level of platitude.' Like a resolution, 3 it expresses an
intent to achieve a goal, or the adoption of a path that leads in a certain
direction, but falls short of mandatory status. 4

See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2007).
See supra Part III.A. 1.v.
330
See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
331
Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Baker v. San Carlos
Irrigation Project Dist., 176 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (D. Ariz. 2001) (holding that a directive must
be mandatory and sufficiently specific), rev'd, 58 Fed. Appx. 303 (9th Cir. 2003). The Baker
court is inexact in its phraseology when it uses the conjunctive "and"; one of the factors-if not
the most important factor-in deciding mandatoriness is specificity. Baker, 176 F. Supp. 2d at
977. It is an aspect of mandatoriness, not a separate requirement. Id.
328
329

332
See, e.g., Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[The] provision
is not a mandatory and specific policy, and the language itself implicates the NPS's broader
mandate to balance access with conservation.").
See supra text accompanying notes 144-46 (discussing the nature of a "resolution").
334
The list of cases that have found language too broad to comprise a mandate are numerous.
See, e.g., Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the language of
the Naval Investigative Service investigation guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate);
Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1430-33 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the NPS policy
guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179-80
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding the NPS policy guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate).
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To caricature the point as a means of making it, platitudes such as "Be
safe" and "Do good," however heartfelt, do not amount to orders of any type
because they imply discretion in the means by which the "safe" can be
accomplished or the "good" can be employed. In other words, if the statement
stays at this level of abstraction, without a clear course of action that must be
taken, the first prong of the DFE is not met.335
To put things in yet a third way-a principle precedes the mandate, and
ultimately cannot be realized without it, but is not to be confused with the
mandate. 33 6 "The quarters should be kept safe and operational at all times" is a
principle or goal that cannot be realized without a definitive course of action
that. brings it to pass, such as directives to "lock all doors" and "conduct
monthly maintenance checks." 3 Without the latter, there is discretion in the
implementation, a fact that is intrinsically at odds with obligatory conduct.338
A legal articulation of the above is found in Shansky v. United States,33 9
in which the First Circuit explains the difference between a "goal" and a
"mandate":
[The Plaintiff] finds succor in a broadly worded expression of a
general policy goal contained in the Park Service's operating
manual to the effect that "[t]he saving of human life will take
precedence over all other management actions." But this
passage does not specifically prescribe that any particular
safety measure be employed at any particular place or in any
particular facility. To the contrary, it suggests that the Park
Service and its functionaries will have to make discretionary
judgments about how to apply concretely the aspirational goal
embedded in the statement. Statements made at this level of
generality do not satisfy . . specific prescription requirement.
Were the law otherwise, the discretionary function exception
would be a dead letter.340
The Tenth Circuit also makes the distinction in Tippett v. United States,3 41 in
which the court in a more succinct fashion states that "[t]he general goal of
protecting human life in the nation's national parks is not the kind of specific
mandatory directive that operated to divest [the park ranger] of discretion in the

See cases cited supra note 326.
In this context, a principle of some sort is a preparatory condition to a mandate.
337
See, e.g., Valdez, 56 F.3d at 1180 ("While the said policy guidelines certainly outline
general policy goals regarding visitor safety, the means by which NPS employees meet these
goals necessarily involves an exercise of discretion.").
338
See cases cited supra note 326.
339
164 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 1999).
340
Id. at 691 (citations omitted).
341
108 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1997).
3

336
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situation he faced." 342 Obviously, a generality so broad that it requires
discretion to implement is a matter of judgment, and a matter of judgment is
necessarily a matter of policy, which the DFE protects from being secondguessed.343 Excessive breadth, therefore, leads not only to a failure of the first
prong, but also to a failure of the second prong of the DFE.
Another way that courts have articulated, however circuitously, the
need for specificity in a mandate is by making the point that a mandate must
have a certain scope. In other words, there must be both a clear course of action
for actuating a principle and the principle must be capable of actuation. In
Deuser v. Vecera,3 45 an Eighth Circuit opinion, park rangers released a drunk
man that they had detained during a city festival.346 He later wandered onto a
highway and was killed.34 7 The decedent's family sued under the FTCA,
claiming that the Park Service did not have the authority to terminate an arrest,

342
Id. at 1197; see also Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1250 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that regulations did not proscribe a specific course of action for lighting backfires); Franklin Say.
Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding the alleged mandate
"neither elaborates [a] general command nor specifies how to perform the discretionary task of
balancing timeliness, efficiency, and return. The final passage lists four broad considerations to
balance, in an unspecified calculus, without specifying a course of action for the complex task of
managing asset sales."); C.R.S. ex rel. D. B. S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that blood screening measures described no particular type of screen, and, therefore, left
the decision open to discretionary exercise); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 721-22 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the legislative advisement for the Park Service "to provide a ... safe[ ]
and suitable approach for passenger-vehicle traffic" was "general, sweeping language ...
insufficient to remove questions of design and construction"); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d
1527, 1540-41 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a set of "minimum attainments" were not mandates
because they set no course of action); Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 786-87
(W.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that criminal laws were "written at a level of generality such that they
fail to prescribe a nondiscretionary course of action"). But see McMichael v. United States, 856
F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a department policy prescribed a specific course of
action to take in an electrical storm); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that a policy set forth a specific course of action for the elevation of electrical
lines); Harvey v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Wabash Cnty., 416 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981),
abrogated by City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 39 N.E. 3d 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
adherence to a traffic manual was prescribed by statute).
343
See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 798 (1984) (stating that the DFE's legislative intent was to protect the government
from "second-guessing" when it made decisions "grounded in social, economic, and political
policy").
344
See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) ("[I]f a regulation allows the
employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a
discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which
led to the promulgation of the regulations.").
345
139 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 1998).
346
Id. at 1192.
347
Id.
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once made.348 In holding that the service's standard operating procedures did
not mandate a policy in these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit said:
It would be impossible to put into a manual every possible
scenario a ranger might encounter, and then to decide in
advance for the ranger whether an arrest should be made and,
once made, under what circumstances an arrest could be
terminated. Just as the rangers had discretion to decide (within
constitutional limits, of course) when and whether to make an
arrest, so they had-and here exercised-discretion to
terminate an arrest without charging the suspect. Under the
terms of the Handbook, that discretion became even broader
during the Fair. We hold that terminating Deuser's arrest, that
is, releasing him without charging him with a crime, was a
discretionary function reserved to the judgment of the
rangers.34 9

The point also relates to the essential condition, in that a mandate cannot be
recognizable as such if it is impossible to articulate in a set of terms. 3 50 This
seems to admit something essential about directives: they can anticipate a
certain decided set of circumstances related to a principle that is of a certain
scope.351 What a police officer or park ranger must do in every circumstance
cannot possibly be articulated; 35 2 it is highly unlikely that what a police officer
or park ranger must do in circumstances involving all intoxicated or belligerent
detainees can be mandated; 35 3 it is more likely that what a police officer or park
ranger must do when a belligerent detainee has a weapon and is threatening to
shoot can be articulated.354 This makes a mandate of such a statement made by
the proper authority, to the proper audience, in the proper form, using the
proper language, and without any controverting sincerity evidence.5
As stated above, when there is a stated set of factors for the
government to apply in what is consummately a governmental functionweighing, balancing, and judging-the circumstances are ripe for a government
35635
victory. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, the plaintiff
348

Id.

34

Id. at 1195.
See supra Part III.A. 1.iv (discussing essential conditions).

350

351
352

353

See generally Deuser, 139 F.3d at 1190.
See, e.g., id. at 1195.
See, e.g., id.

See, e.g., McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that
"the Department policy prescribed a course of action for the inspector to follow in the event of
any electrical storm, and the inspector had no choice but to adhere to that directive").
355
See supra Part II.A. 1iv (describing the felicity conditions for a mandate).
356
See case cited supra note 309.
354
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argued that the government was required to close a forest to public access; 358 by
not doing so, the plaintiffs land was damaged.3 59 The applicable plan for
closure of the woods contained a specific five factor assessment.360 With regard
to those factors, the district court of Oregon reasoned as follows:

'

The existence of the five factors does not require that the forest
be closed. Rather, the five factors would have to exist to
completely close the woods, but the mere existence of these
factors does not mandate that the woods be closed, just that the
threshold requirement has been met and the woods may be
closed. The final decision whether to close the forest remained
with Mr. Grace, depending upon his evaluation and weighing
of the public's need for open forests and the costs entailed with
closing the forests against the danger of fire.3 6
Regardless of how specific the factors were, they need not lead to closure.362
Specificity is a hallmark of mandates, 3 63 but other features can undo the
mandatoriness of the statement. 36
However, an argument that answers the "weighing of factors"
circumstances was set out by the Eighth Circuit in Appley Brothers v. United
States.365 There, the court distinguished between the discretion to issue a
revocation order after consulting certain data and a mandate to consult that
data:
In conducting the August 5 inspection, the inspectors violated
not only the mandatory requirements of the grain inspector's
handbook, but also the stated purpose of their inspection. The
inspectors had no discretion on August 5 as to whether they
should check to see if Bird Grain had cured the deficiencies
found on April 1 and to issue a new TW-125 reporting that
information .... The fact that there is no written policy
mandating that the U.S.D.A. revoke Bird Grain's license if
inspectors discover substantial shortages is not fatal to Appley

3

782 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Or. 1991).

358

Id. at 1461.

359

Id.

360

Id. at 1464.

361

Id. at 1465.

See id. at 1464-65.
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) ("[T]he discretionary function
exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow.").
364
See cases cited supra note 342.
365
7 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1993).
362
363
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Brothers' argument that the discretionary function does not
apply. Although the revocation order itself is discretionary, the
inspectors' failure to see if Bird Grain cleared the violations
noted in the April 1 report prevented the Secretary from
exercisi discretion to decide whether to revoke Bird Grain's
license.3
In other words, while the inspector retained the discretion to issue the order
once he had made the necessary check, he had no authority not to make the
check. 6 Regardless of how much weighing and judging the government must
do, if the mandate requires that the government weigh and judge, it must do
36
lue6il9r
will result in the inapplicability of the DFE.369
so.38
Failure
V. A FACTORS APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING MANDATES FROM GUIDELINES

As is apparent from the above discussion of the DFE, for some time the
courts have implicitly, and unwittingly, relied upon the logic that underpins the
linguistic distinctions explained in this Article. However, they have struggled to
articulate a clear analytic framework for use in the tort claims area. This Article
will now explain such a framework for the judiciary's use.
The scientific perspective provided by the linguistic analysis of speech
acts reveals that certain facts supply information necessary as to whether a
particular statement is a mandate or a guideline. 37 0 Their credibility is owing to
the fact that they agree with the felicity conditions that establish mandates and
distinguish them from guidelines.37 1 As such, this information can be formed
into a set of factors for use by both practitioners and judges-the former when
arguing that a statement was or was not a mandate, the latter when deciding the
same. The factors are as follows:
1. Parties: Who made the statement and to whom was the
statement made? Did the speaker have the requisite
authority to speak? Did the audience have the requisite
authority and power to carry out the alleged mandate?
This factor corresponds to the preparatory condition for a mandate. 37 2 it
underlies the rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the

366

Id. at 725-26 (citations omitted).

367

See id.

368

See id. (indicating that before an inspector can exercise discretion, he has to conduct an

inspection).
369

See, e.g., id.

370

See supra Part IV.

371

See supra Part III.A. 1.iv (describing felicity conditions).
See supra Parts III.A. 1.iv, IV.A.

372
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speaker and the audience. Unless the proper parties are involved, a statement
cannot be a mandate.
2. Custom and Usage: How was the alleged mandate
interpreted by the relevant parties? How long was this
understanding in place? How was the alleged mandate
enforced?
This factor corresponds to the sincerity condition for a mandate, and is
informed by means of the statement's perlocutionary effect.373 It underlies the
rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the way that the
statement was considered by the parties and the attitudes they took toward it.
Failure to treat a mandate as a mandate can compromise an appreciation of its
nature. 37 4
3. Expression: How formal were the means by which the
alleged mandate was communicated? What kind of
language was used (mandatory or precatory)? How specific
was the alleged mandate?
This factor corresponds to the essential condition for a mandate.375 It underlies
the rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the language
used, the means of its conveyance, and the clarity of its expression. A mandate
must be recognizable as such-the form it takes, the words that comprise it,
and the specificity with which it is related, are key to that recognition.
Although all of the above factors are relevant to the mandate/guideline
inquiry, some points can be made about how courts have applied and
prioritized them. Evidence as to the expression of the mandate has held most
sway in finding a statement to be a mandate, with specificity being the most
determinative aspect, followed by language, and then form.376 While the
importance of custom and usage can be attenuated by a clear expression of the
mandate, when that clarity is lacking, courts consult prior history to resolve the
ambiguity.3 77 And although a challenge on the grounds that the proper parties

were not involved in. the communication of the mandate is rare, it is a
significant factor. Still, a history of custom and usage whereby an alleged
mandate was treated as such despite the fact that the rule-giver did not actually
have the authority to hand down the rule, or the rule-performer did not actually

374

See supra Parts III.A.1.iii, III.A.1.iv, IV.B.
See supra Part III.A. .iii (discussing the recognizability of an utterance).

3

See supra Part III.A. 1.iv.

37

See cases cited supra note 342.
3n
See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360-61 (1st Cir. 1991) (examining the
customary treatment of a rule in question to determine its nature).
376
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have the power to actuate it, would logically weigh towards finding a mandate
on estoppel grounds. 37 8
Of course, use of these factors might also be seen along a continuum
akin to the formalist vs. instrumentalist approaches to statutory
interpretation. 7 If the "plain meaning" of the words is clear, no other evidence
need be consulted, or so goes the argument. 380 The degree to which the other
factors are taken into account-be they prior history, evidence of authority,
etc.-would be akin to seeking elucidation from legislative history and other
external determinants.3 8 ' Further, the degree to which specificity and clarity can
be gleaned from other sources is akin to courts deciding to consult the canons
of statutory interpretation, such as Expressio unius ("the express mention of
one thing excludes all others"), In pari materia ("meaning can be gleaned from
other rules upon the same matter or subject"), and Noscitur a soccis ("a word is
known by the company it keeps"). 382
Hopefully, the factors set forth here will provide a clear and precise
tool by which courts can approach the often complex, muddled area of
determining when a statement should be classified as a rule or a suggestion, as
a "should" or a "must."
VI. CONCLUSION

It is worth noting that often when courts hold that the DFE does not
apply, they say that "the statement told X to do something, but did not tell him
how to do it," and therefore X acted "at his discretion."38 3 What the courts
should be saying is that because it was not clear what X should do, he was not
378

See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text

3
Another parallel to this factors approach would be contractual interpretation. From a
policy standpoint, ambiguities in a contract are typically construed against the drafter, as he
"controls the pen." This is the doctrine of contra proferentem, of ancient origin. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); David Horton, Flipping
The Script: Contra Proferentem and StandardForm Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 431 (2009).
Risk allocation also provides a similar parallel: "[R]isk is best borne by the party who makes the

mistake than by some wholly innocent party." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES:
REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS 82 (2004) (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN,

TORTS § 1.4.2, at 13 (1999)).
380
See Steven W. Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving Contractual Ambiguity in
Tennessee: A Systematic Approach, 68 TENN. L. REv. 73, 80-81 (2000).
381
See Ellen P. Aprill & Nancy Staudt, Theories of Statutory Interpretation (and Their
Limits), 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1899, 1900-01 (2005).
382

See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35

(1960).
383
See, e.g., Franklin Say. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that "[flour of the five requirements to maintain asset values, avoid sales that reduce
franchise value, maximize value, and schedule sales based on various concerns . . . state[d]
general goals . .. in precatory rather than mandatory language").
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given a mandate; the DFE does not apply, but for the reason that anything so
generally stated stays at the level of the goal, the objective, the guideline.
Mandates must be clear, stated to the right party, by the right party, through the
right means, and treated as mandates by all involved. In so doing, they comport
with what the law, and language, requires them to be.

The court's task is a difficult one, balancing the needs of plaintiffs,
whose injuries are no less grave simply because the tortfeasor is the
government, against the needs of government agencies, whose tasks of public
service lie somewhere between an art and a science, between absolute duties
and subjective interpretations. When immunity is at stake, the costs are always
high; as such, a careful, scientific determination of language can benefit not
only interpreters but also drafters, providing a precise articulation of what is
expected and who is accountable, and thereby also benefitting the public at
large, whose safety and well-being are served in the process.
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